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Articles
EXCHANGE, CONTRACT AND LAW IN THE STONE AGE
Joseph M. Perfillo*
INTRODUCTION
Philosophers, economists, political scientists and lawyers have con-
structed many theories to explain the exchange process and the reasons why
contracts are enforced. To understand the wellsprings of human behavior it
is useful to start with the Stone Age. Fortunately, neolithic peoples existed
well into the twentieth century, and data about contractual behavior in such
societies as well as pre-literate societies in later stages of development have
been collected. The quantity of data is enormous, although for the legal
scholar, much of it stops at the point where it is about to become most ger-
mane; anthropologists, explorers and missionaries generally do not share the
legal scholars' concerns. Sir Henry Maine's 1861 statement is probably truer
today than when he wrote:
Theories, plausible and comprehensive, but absolutely unverified, such
as the Law of Nature or the Social Compact, enjoy a universal prefer-
ence over sober research into the primitive history of society and law;
and they obscure the truth not only by diverting attention from the
only quarter in which it can be found, but by that most real and most
important influence which, when once entertained and believed in,
they are enabled to exercise on the later stages of jurisprudence.'
Oliver Wendell Holmes spoke in a similar vein. In a lecture delivered in
1886 he stated "[i]f your subject is law, the roads are plain to anthropology,
the science of man." 2 Although Maine and others, such as Sir Paul Vino-
gradoff,3 followed this road to anthropology, they did so from sources dating
to eras after the dawn of Western civilization. These sources reveal little
about truly primitive society and almost nothing about non-western socie-
ties. For example, sociologist Emile Durkheim's lengthy discussion of prim-
* Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law, Fordham University. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the Faculty of Law in Tel Aviv. I am indebted for valued comments made at that
time by Professor Menachem Mautner. I also wish to thank Robert Kaczorowski and Maria Mar-
cus for their valuable comments on a prior draft of this paper.
1. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 3 (10th ed. 1884 & 1970 reprint).
2. O.W. HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 29, 30 (1921).
3. Kg., P. VINOGRADOFF, VILLAINAGE IN ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN ENGLISH MEDIEVAL HiS-
TORY (1892).
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itive law focuses on the Hebrew Pentateuch, the Roman Twelve Tables and
other documents showing a political and religious order more complex than
generally prevails in neolithic societies. 4 Despite changes in technology that
have occurred since these documents were originally composed, the societies
that produced them probably bear a greater affinity to our own than to neo-
lithic societies.
This Article organizes some of the data involving exchange in primitive
societies. It seeks to avoid the construction of a grand theory. Readers may
draw their own conclusions. Nonetheless, where facts clearly are at variance
with speculations of such notables as legal philosopher John Austin, sociolo-
gists Emile Durkheim and Max Weber and historian Karl Polanyi, the
writer could not resist highlighting such discrepancies.
Although the enforceability of contracts is a principal concern of this
Article, most of the discussion addresses the context in which contracts are
made and enforced in primitive society. It first considers the existence of law
in stateless societies and then distinguishes law from custom, political action
and instinctive behavior. This Article next discusses two kinds of exchanges,
reciprocal gift and business-like exchange, and then examines several strate-
gies for inter-group trade to protect the traders from the dangers of Stone
Age society such as headhunting, cannibalism and slavery. At this point, the
Article proceeds to contract law: the forms of contract, debt collection
methods and dispute resolution. Finally, the Article considers why con-
tracts are enforced and summarizes some of the themes raised in the paper.
I. BEFORE THE STATE THERE Is LAW
In the mountains of northern Luzon, the principal island of the Philip-
pines, dwell the Ifugao, agriculturalists and headhunters who have con-
structed, without the aid of metal tools, rice terraces which "still have a
sweep and grandeur unequaled anywhere in the world." 5 "Of political or-
ganization the Ifugao has nothing-not even a suggestion."' 6 The lack of
political government is "absolute." 7 Yet, they have "a well-developed sys-
4. E. DURKHEIM, 1 THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 92-99 (1964).
5. Eggan, Foreword to R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW xvii (1919 & photo. reprint 1969) [hereinaf-
ter R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW]. (This Foreword was written for the reprint.).
On these steep mountains that rise from sea level to heights of six to eight thousand
feet-mountains as steep probably as any in the world-there have been carved out, with
wooden spades and wooden crowbars, terraces that run like the crude but picturesque
'stairsteps' of a race of giants, from the bases almost to the summit. Some of these terrace
walls are fifty feet high. More than half are walled with stone. Water to flood these ter-
races is retained by a little rim of earth at the outer margin. The soil is turned in prepara-
tion for planting with a wooden spade. No mountain is too steep to be terraced, if it affords
an unfailing supply of water for irrigation.
R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra, at 2.
This description is quoted here to demonstrate that technological and agricultural sophistica-
tion can exist in a Neolithic culture that is not organized as a State.
6. R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 2. The quotation is in the present tense. The
Ifugao were brought under governmental control during the American occupation and presumably
are now under the control of the Philippine government. Throughout this Article, the historical
present tense will sometimes be employed to describe ethnic groups whose ways may have since
changed by the impact of colonization or other foreign contact.
7. Id.
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tem of laws." 8 The ethnographer who reached these conclusions was able to
describe their private law, there being no public law. For example, he noted
the rule that an executory agreement for the sale of a rice field does not bind
the buyer, but binds the seller, provided the seller initiated the transaction. 9
Yet there is no king, chief or court to order the payment of damages; there is
only private dispute resolution.' 0 Rich men lend generously and are re-
paid." Farmers create and irrigate fields and appropriate them to private
ownership. Property law and water law exist, are respected, and are of enor-
mous importance in the economic and social life of the community.12 Con-
tracts with respect of these and other matters are an important part of their
social and economic system and function without a State.
In the Klamath River Valley of the northern California redwood coun-
try live the Yoruks, a people whose "law is of the utmost refinement. A few
simple and basic principles are projected into the most intricate subtleties;
and there is no contingency which they do not cover."' 13 Yet there is no
government, no authority other than the head of the household. 14 Nonethe-
less, the acquisition of money (dentalium shells) and property is the foremost
concern of the Yoruk.' 5 All land is under private ownership. I 6 As with the
Ifugao, law and property exist without government.
The law of no Stone Age people has been better studied than the
Kapauku Papuans of the highlands of what was formerly Netherlands New
Guinea. Studies 17 were conducted by Leopold Pospisil, 18 an ethnographer
with a law degree from Charles University, 19 Prague, of the Kapauku before
the Dutch exerted effective control over them and before any but an insub-
stantial amount of western goods and influence entered the area.20 He was
8. Id.
9. Id. at 52.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 222-27.
11. R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 3, 49-50.
12. Id. at 32-53.
13. 1 A. KROEBER, HANDBOOK OF THE INDIANS OF CALIFORNIA 2-3 (1925 & photo. reprint
1972).
14. Id. at 3. See also H. DRIVER, INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 294 (2d ed. 1969).
15. "The consequence is that the Yoruk concerns his life above all else with property. When he
has leisure, he thinks of money; if in need he calls upon it. He schemes constantly for opportunity to
lodge a claim or evade an obligation." 1 A. KROEBER, supra note 13, at 2; see also id. at 40-41. The
Yoruk are not unique in their desire and respect for wealth. See R. LowIE, PRIMITIVE SOCIETY
342-45 (1947). For a comparison of Yoruk attitudes and the protestant ethic, see Goldschmidt,
Ethics and the Structure of Society: An Ethnological Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge, 53
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 506 (1951).
16. See 1 A. KROEBER, supra note 13, at 34.
17. These studies include L. POsPISIL, THE ETHNOLOGY OF LAW (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter L.
PoSPIsIL, ETHNOLOGY]; L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW (1971) [hereinafter L. POSPISIL,
ANTHROPOLOGY]; L. POSPISIL, THE KAPAUKU PAPUANS OF WEST NEW GUINEA (1963) [hereinaf-
ter L. POSPISIL, WEST NEW GUINEA]; Pospisil, Structural Change and Primitive Law: Conse-
quences of a Papuan Legal Case, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 208 (L. Nader ed. 1969)
[hereinafter Pospisil, Structural Change]; L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS AND THEIR LAW (1958
& 1964 photo. reprint) [hereinafter L. POsISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS].
18. His methodology was inspired by the case study of Cheyenne law by Karl Llewellyn and E.
Adamson Hoebel. L. POsPIsIL, WEST NEW GUINEA, supra note 17, at v.
19. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941). See L. POSPISIL, ETHNOL-
OGY, supra note 17, at 24-25.
20. L. POSPISIL, WEST NEW GUINEA, supra note 17, at 3.
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able to discover and explain exquisitely detailed rules of land tenure2' and to
formulate 119 rules governing behavior. Typical is the rule Pospisil num-
bered 110.
Property should be seized by force if a man refuses to meet his obliga-
tions which have their origin in contract or in an act causing damage
to other people. The act of seizure precludes any further obligation on
the part of the defendant irrespective of the possible low value of the
property seized. 22
Here, too, in the Kapauku Papuan society, law exists without government,
but, as discussed below, there is an embryonic system of politics based upon
the de facto leader of the village or other social group, called the "rich
man" 23 or "big man." 24 Even this degree of political structure is, however,
lacking among some other primitive peoples, such as the Tsembaga and
other groups of Maring speakers in New Guinea, who have "no hereditary
or elective chiefs nor.., even 'big men' who can regularly coerce or com-
mand the support of their clansmen or co-residents in economic or forceful
enterprises. '25
In order to conclude that these peoples are living under a system of law
without a State, it is first necessary to explain what is meant by a "State."
This is difficult because among political scientists there seems to be no gener-
ally agreed upon definition of a State. Most of them would perhaps agree
that if ten strangers are cast adrift in a life boat, one or more leaders would
emerge, but the population of the boat would not be a State. The peoples
described here resemble the population of the boat more than they resemble
Leviathan, the State postulated by Hobbes as the necessary alternative to the
war of all against all.
One could cite multiple examples of peoples who are stateless and un-
governed. The Eskimo and the Indians of the Great Basin of Utah, Nevada,
and northeastern Mexico all have no political organization.26 In Africa, the
Hazda, Nuer and Luhya have minimal or no government.27 These, how-
ever, are not peoples without law. For all these groups it can emphatically
be said that law is not the command of the sovereign.28 Charles Darwin in
21. L. POSPISIL, ETHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 72-108 (a revision of L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU
PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 97-100, 176-84 and of L. POSPISIL, WEST NEW GUINEA, supra note 17,
at 25-31).
22. L. PoSPIsIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 234.
23. L. PosPisIL, ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 17, at 65-72.
24. Other ethnographers use this term, rather than "rich man," to describe similar leaders in
other New Guinea groups, because wealth, although indispensable, is not the only condition of lead-
ership. See P. BROwN, HIGHLAND PEOPLES OF NEW GUINEA 194-97 (1978); L. POSPISIL, AN-
THROPOLOGY, supra note 17, at 16.
25. Rappaport, Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations Among a New Guinea People, in
MELANESIA, READINGS ON A CULTURE AREA 68, 69-70 (L. Langness & J. Wechsler eds. 1971).
26. H. DRIVER, supra note 14, at 288-90. Pospisil would disagree on the theory that although
there is no government, there are, in every group, leaders. He would classify leadership as a form of
political organization. L. PosPIsm, ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 17, at 44-78, 91.
27. L. MAIR, PRIMITIVE GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF TRADITIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN
EASTERN AFRICA 56-61 (rev. ed. 1970).
28. A theorist who holds to the dogma that law is the command of the sovereign would argue
that what I have described above is not law. J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, Lects. I,
XXX (Campbell 5th ed. 1885 & photo. reprint 1972). For an effort to harmonize Austin's theory of
positive law with the existence of stateless law, see Stolijar, How Can Feud-law Be Properly So Called,
[Vol. 31
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his travels in Tierra del Fuego noted that "[tihe different tribes have no gov-
ernment or chief."29 He connected their statelessness with one aspect of his
not yet fully formulated theory of evolution, arguing that the absence of
political organization retarded the development of civilization.30
A. Law Versus Custom
Anthropologists and others have difficulty in discerning the dividing
line between law and custom in stateless societies. 31 The problem can be
understood by using a Western illustration. The laws of the Western world
require that debts be paid. Yet many debts go unpaid. Western custom dic-
tates that a guest at a wedding reception must bring or send a gift.32 Para-
doxically, there are few violations. One can prove that the debt rule is law
and the wedding gift rule is custom by the affidavits of lawyers and the prof-
fer of law books.
Do these same two strands exist in primitive societies? If they do exist,
can an outsider separate the strands? Karl Llewellyn, the noted legal
scholar, and anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel devised a system to accom-
plish this analysis. They put together a casebook, by going among the Chey-
enne, interviewing tribal elders concerning the handling of "trouble cases."
Law was distinguished from social custom by four criteria. First, law has
sanctions. "The legal has teeth. What it protects is protected; if its prohibi-
tions be disregarded, somebody can do something about it.''33 Llewellyn and
Hoebel recognized that law is not only a set of prohibitions but also offers
channels for facilitating legal acts such as marriages, wills and contracts.34
Second, the law is supreme. "You will know the legal by the fact that if
13 U.W. AUsTL. L. REV. 262, 265-69 (1977-78). The nature of "law" as used in this paper is
discussed infra in part II.
29. C. DARWIN, THE VOYAGE OF THE BEAGLE 231 (1909) (first published in 1839).
30. He summarized his views thus:
The perfect equality among the individuals composing the Fuegian tribes must for a
long time retard their civilization. As we see those animals, whose instinct compels them
to live in society and obey a chief, are most capable of improvement, so is it with the races
of mankind. Whether we look at it as a cause or a consequence, the more civilized always
have the most artificial governments. For instance, the inhabitants of Otaheite, who, when
first discovered, were governed by hereditary kings, had arrived at a far higher grade than
another branch of the same people, the New Zealanders, who, although benefited by being
compelled to turn their attention to agriculture, were republicans in the most absolute
sense.
Id. at 245.
31. For discussions of the literature, see E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 20-22
(1967); L. PosPIsm, ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 17, at 11-28.
32. "Custom" is used here to mean rules of social behavior that are not legally binding and that
are enforced or penalized only by social disapproval. At times such custom may consist of complex
and detailed rules. See, eg., J. WILSON, THE CODE OF HONOR; OR RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF PRINCIPALS AND SECONDS IN DUELING (1858). Legally binding "custom and usage" is ex-
cluded. Thus the discussion stands outside the British tradition of discussing custom and law in an
Austinian framework, where the focus is not on extra-legal customs but on customary law that is not
clearly the command of the sovereign. See, eg., G. SADLER, THE RELATION OF CUSTOM TO LAW
(1919 & 1986 reprint). For an attempt to escape the Austinian strait-jacket-the dogma that law is
the command of the sovereign-while falling into the trap that all custom and law are undifferenti-
ated, see E. HARTLAND, PRIMITIVE LAW 137-66 (1924 & 1970 reissue).
33. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, supra note 19, at 283 (1941) (emphasis in original).
34. Id.
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appealed to, it prevails."35 Third, "[t]he legal is part of the going order...
and violences which are outside the... going order are extra-legal,. . . even
when successful."'36 This thought can perhaps be subsumed under the rubric
of "regularity of application." 37 Fourth, "[t]he legal has an aspect of recog-
nized officialdom about it... which 'manners' or 'morals' lack until they
acquire 'legal' backing." 38 This fourth criterion shows no recognition that
some societies lack officials,39 although it is probably true that all societies
have leaders who are more powerful than others in the society.4°
Pospisil, building on the analysis of the law-custom dichotomy made by
Llewellyn and Hoebel, also delineated four criteria for determining whether
a rule is "legal" rather than social or moral. First, what his predecessors
called "officialdom" Pospisil describes as "authority."' a His stress is on the
person or persons who have the power to compel or persuade compliance
with the rule. This may be a chief, a village headman (the "rich man" or
"big man"), a family head or the aggrieved party himself.42 Second, in place
of "regularity" he sets forth the idea of "intention of universal applica-
tion. '' 43 The difference is more than a nuance. "Regularity" implies an un-
changing system. "Intention of universal application" implies that
intentions may change and that law is changeable. 44 Third, in place of
"supremacy" Pospisil utilizes the civil law concept of obligatio,45 a term that
roughly means a right-duty relationship recognized by law.46 Somewhat
confusingly he contends that the obligatio includes the facts as found by the
authority whether or not the facts were correctly found. In so arguing Pos-
pisil appears to inject the fact skepticism of certain American legal realists
into the Roman concept of obligatio.47 Pospisil observes that obligatio helps
distinguish legal from religious rules.48 Fourth, he agrees that law requires a
sanction for a breach. Unlike many non-lawyers, neither Pospisil nor Llew-
35. Id. at 284 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. (emphasis in original).
37. E. HOEBEL, supra note 31, at 28.
38. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, supra note 19, at 284.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10, 14 & 23-27. The Cheyenne are a politically organ-
ized society, with chiefs and military leaders. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, supra note 19, at 68-
131.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 228-30.
41. L. PosPIsIL, ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 17, at 44-78; L. POSPISIL, ETHNOLOGY, supra
note 17, at 30-43.
42. Twelve such cases are described in L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17 (case
nos. 32, 34, 59, 66, 67, 82, 84, 88, 90, 92, 126, 138).
43. L. PospisiL, ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 17, at 78-81.
44. Id.
45. L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 17, at 81-87; L. POSPISIL, ETHNOGRAPHY, supra
note 17, at 46-48.
46. On obligatio, see in ascending order of complexity: B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ROMAN LAW 99-103, 158-59 (1962); J. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 213-23 (1976); W.
BUCKLAND, A TExT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 405-12 (3d ed. 1966).
47. Although trained in the civil law tradition, he embraced American legal realism. See L.
POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 17, at 31-37.
48. The interplay between law and religion is complex. As punishment for non-payment of a
debt the creditor may resort to sorcery to cause the illness of his debtor. I. HOGBIN, THE ISLAND OF
MENSTRUATING MEN: RELIGION IN WOGEO, NEW GUINEA 170 (1970) [hereinafter I. HOGUIN,
THE ISLAND]. Supernatural and societal sanctions are treated indiscriminately in E. HARTLAND,
supra note 32, at 137-66. See case no. 119 in L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at
220-21, where the judgment is perceived as a legal judgment with some black magic thrown in.
[Vol. 31
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ellyn restrict the notion of sanctions to physical force. Reprimands,49 the
Eskimo equivalent of the scarlet letter,50 injunctions, 51 and money judg-
ments52 are among the sanctions known to Stone Age humanity.
Pospisil's refinements of Llewellyn-Hoebel's criteria for law are helpful
but an element of tautology remains. If obligatio, a right-duty relationship
recognized by law, is part of the definition of law, the reasoning is circular.
Although law is difficult to define, Pospisil's criteria are helpful in focusing
our sights. It is useful to examine the phenomenon from the point of view of
remedies. If a person wishes to assert his rights against an offending party,
will he be able to obtain an authoritative decision redressing his grievance, a
decision made pursuant to a rule that is intended to be of universal applica-
tion? If so, the rule is law. Custom is also powerful but has different sanc-
tions than law.
B. Law Versus Political Action
Decisions or conduct by the politically powerful are not necessarily pur-
suant to law. They may be acts of gangsterism or of corruption.5 3 Or they
may be ad hoc political determinations such as a decision to make war or
refrain from warfare or whether to massacre or to welcome a boat full of
shipwrecked sailors. For example, it is the custom on many Melanesian is-
lands to kill shipwrecked strangers.54 On Tikopia, one Paefakofe gained
great authority and heroic status by singlehandedly killing the entire crew of
a boat. Subsequently he intervened to "veto" the killing of another ship-
wrecked crew.55 Accordingly, in that society, the decision to kill while not
prohibited by law is also not required by law. In sum, much political activ-
ity may be illegal or legally irrelevant and should not be confused with law.
C. Law Versus Instinctive Behavior
Species other than homo sapiens have social organization with rules re-
specting rank, territory, schooling (traveling in a pack), division of labor,
and personal space. 56 Additionally, members of a species sometimes form
49. E. HARTLAND, PRIMITIVE LAW, supra note 32, at 161-64 (ridicule and contempt); L. Pos-
PISIL, KAPUAKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 267-68 (discussing case 124, quoted infra at text ac-
companying note 238).
50. "A Nunamiut [Eskimo] who steals a Kayak is renamed Kayak .... Every time the name is
used the offender is reminded, in a public and shaming way, of his crime." L. POSPISIL, ANTHRO-
POLOGY, supra note 17, at 95.
51. R. BARTON, supra note 5, at 100; L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 181-
82.
52. R. BARTON, supra note 5, at 71; L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 269-
70.
53. See, eg., L. POSPISIL, ETHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 45 (summarizing cases analyzed in L.
POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 207, 232-33, 242, cases 97, 139-42, 165).
54. 1 REPORTS OF THE CAMBRIDGE ANTHROPOLOGICAL EXPEDITION TO THE TORRES
STRAIT 9, 84, 196, 349 (Johnson reprint 1971 of 1935 ed.) (based on observations made in 1898-
1899) [hereinafter I TORRES STRAIT]; 5 REPORTS OF THE CAMBRIDGE ANTHROPOLOGICAL EXPE-
DITIoN TO THE TORRES STRAIT (Johnson reprint 1971 of 1904 ed.) (based on observations made in
1888-1889, 1898) [hereinafter 5 TORRES STRAIT]; 1 W. RIVERS, THE HISTORY OF MELANESIAN
SOCIETY 322 (1914 & 1968 reprint).
55. 1 W. RIVERS, supra note 54, at 340-41.
56. D. ELLIS, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR AND ITS APPLICATION 81-87 (1985).
19891
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symbiotic relations with members of a different species.57 These rules of
social behavior often resemble law. For example, territoriality has certain
attributes of law in that territorial rights are generally respected by other
members of the species,58 and even when territorial rights are violated, the
trespass is often furtive.59 When confronted, the trespassers may quickly
withdraw even when faced with inferior force.60
Although it is clear that many kinds of animals can think and learn,
there is no indication that a group of animals can consciously change its
organizational rules.61 While the rules of social control observed by territo-
rial animals seem to fit the criteria developed by Llewellyn and Hoebel for
distinguishing law from extra-legal rules of conduct, they do not satisfy Pos-
pisil's more refined criteria. His substitution of "intention of universal appli-
cation" for Llewellyn and Hoebel's criterion of "regularity" was designed to
accommodate the central distinction between changeable human law and in-
stinctual or other deterministic rules of conduct.6 2 Although law is natural
to humanity, its content is manmade. There are doubtless limitations on
human inventiveness. Strikingly, certain patterns of exchange and methods
of enforcing exchange obligations recur in diverse societies, but not always
and not everywhere. As in so many other aspects of human behavior, it is
clear that similarity of behavior among separated population groups has a
genetic basis, but environmental or other factors such as idiosyncratic inge-
nuity contribute to the diversity of behavior.
II. KINDS OF EXCHANGE: RECIPROCAL GIFT VERSUS
BUSINESS-LIKE EXCHANGE
Economists who study primitive economies fall into at least two broad
categories. The Formalists focus on exchanges and apply standard economic
theories to analyze what they perceive. The Substantive Economists hold
that economic theory, whether it be classical liberalism or another theory,
has little or no role in analyzing and explaining primitive behavior. 63
Anthropologists are similarly divided. Formalist Social Anthropology
claims that cross-cultural analyses may be made. In this it is similar to Eco-
nomic Formalism, although Formalist Anthropologists disagree amongst
themselves in profound ways. Functional Anthropologists focus not on ana-
lyzing transactions that occur but on the social matrix within which they
occur. 64 This Article does not participate in the debate between the schools
of anthropologists and economists (although its title divulges a formalist
viewpoint), but isolates two distinct types of exchanges and shows that, if the
57. Id. at 96-98.
58. IL ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE 248-53 (1966). This is not to say that all
species are territorial. J. Scorr, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 187, 243-45 (2d ed. 1972).
59. R. ARDREY, supra note 58, at 251-52.
60. Id. at 248-49.
61. We do read, however, of alliances among male baboons (contracts?), D. ELLIS, supra note
56, at 245, and the invention of two cultural traits by one chimpanzee and their adoption by the
entire band. Id. at 247-48.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
63. H. SCHNEIDER, ECONOMIC MAN: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ECONOMICS 1-9 (1974).
64. Id. at 9-21.
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observer focuses on either kind of exchange to the neglect of the other, that
observer will be driven into the arms of one or the other of the schools of
Economics and Anthropology.
A. Reciprocal Gift
"Contract" usually connotes business-like exchange. Occasional bind-
ing agreements between close friends or family members are seen as periph-
eral to the core of contractual behavior. Therefore, observers have been
curious about and sometimes mystified by various forms of gift-giving. The
most mysterious is the reciprocal gift. Among the hunter-gatherer
Andamanese islanders, "any object may be had for the asking and without
pay, subject only to the expectancy of a reciprocal gift at a later date."' 65
Similarly it is a rule of Kaupauku law that "[a]ll commodities given as gifts
have to be repaid upon the donor's request."' 66 In the Solomon Islands, a
trading partner offers to trade a pig for ten pots. The offeree gives him
twenty-two pots which he cannot properly refuse. This puts the offeror
under an obligation to eventually deliver another pig. 67 In the Solomon Is-
lands reciprocal exchanges are commonplace. X gives Y a dozen sweet pota-
toes. A short time later Y gives X a dozen sweet potatoes. 68 Thus,
restitutionary obligations co-exist with and perhaps precede promise-based
obligations. 69 In North America the derogatory phrase "Indian giver" was
the Caucasian reaction to the Native American's expectation of receiving
from the unsuspecting Caucasian donee the equivalent of the Native Ameri-
can's gift.70
Judge Posner has given an Economic Formalist explanation for the re-
65. E. HOEBEL, supra note 31, at 296. For reciprocal gifts among the Cheyenne, see K. LLEW-
ELLYN & E. HOEBEL, supra note 19, at 248-51.
66. L. POSPISIL, KAUPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 230.
67. Sahlins, Exchange-Value and the Diplomacy of Primitive Trade, in ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC
ANTHROPOLOGY 95, 111 (J. Helm ed. 1965).
68. B. BLACKWOOD, BOTH SIDES OF THE BUKA PASSAGE 275, 452 (1935 & 1979 reprint). For
similar exchange patterns elsewhere, see E. FERDON, EARLY TAHITI AS THE EXPLORERS SAW IT-
1767-1797, at 221 (1981); I. HOGBIN, THE ISLAND, supra note 48, at 70-71; B. MALINOWSKI, AR-
GONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC 184 (1950).
69. For good illustrations, see Myers, Ideology and Experience: The Cultural Basis of Politics in
Pintupi Life, in ABORIGINAL POWER IN AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY 79, 99-100 (M. Howard ed. 1982).
70. 1 M. MATTHEWS, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICANISMS 872 (1951) contains under the ex-
pression "Indian Gift" the following:
1764 Hutchinson Hist. Mass. I. 469 An Indian gift is a proverbial expression, signify-
ing a present for which an equivalent return is expected. - (2) 1848 Bartlett 189 Indian
Giver. When an Indian gives anything, he expects an equivalent in return, or that the same
thing may be given back to him. This term is applied by children in New York and the
vicinity to a child who, after having given away a thing, wishes to have it back again. 1949
ChL Tribune 9 Jan. 6/i Those who use the term 'Indian Giver' slightingly have never
heard of Pokagon, wise and beloved chieftain of the Pottawatomies. - (3) 1837 Irving
Bonneville II. 71 Captain Bonneville was suitably affected by this mark of friendship; but
his experience in what is proverbially called 'Indian giving,' made him aware that a parting
pledge was necessary on his own part, to prove that this friendship was reciprocated. 1911
Saunders CoL Todhunter 103 But you're sure about it, too, ain't you? She ain't doin' no
Injun-giving in your case?
An early missionary wrote of the Indians in general that "[i]t is a maxim of civility among them, to
make a return when you give anything." L. HENNEPIN, A DESCRIPTION OF LOUISIANA 306 (J.
Shea trans. 1880 & 1966 Readex Microprint) (published in French in 1683).
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ciprocal gift: insurance.71 In case of want caused by typhoon, fire, disease,
or other catastrophe, the member of the society in which reciprocal gift-
giving is practiced can call upon his circle of reciprocal donors for succor
until he or she is able to reciprocate. However, there is more to reciprocal
gift-giving than insurance. There are also ritual gift-exchanges where the
insurance factor is missing: for example, the exchange of Christmas gifts
within the family and the exchange of gifts when Chiefs of State call upon
each other. The function of such an exchange is to create or strengthen the
social solidarity of the participants. Reciprocal gift among stone age human-
ity appears to have a similar function. Moreover, a phenomenon may have
an economic analysis that differs from its sociological analysis. That they
differ does not signify that they are contradictory. 72
Reciprocal gift-giving is normally confined within groups: for example,
the village, the clan, or some other group that envisions itself as "We." An-
thropologists and economists have been fascinated with trading rings that
exist among groups that go beyond the "We," especially the Kula ring of the
Trobriand and nearby islands.73 This ring is not within a close knit social
group but is among participants from societies that are often hostile to each
other. Annual, or more frequent, trades are made between trading partners
on neighboring islands. Two kinds of valuables are exchanged-necklaces
and armshells. A ring member will go to one of his trading partners to re-
ceive, say, a necklace. Perhaps a year later he will be revisited by the giver to
whom he will give an armshell. A "big man" 74 will have many trading
partners.
The necklaces travel throughout the islands in a clockwise direction.
The armshells travel in a counter-clockwise direction. Perpetually. Why?
In islands that possess minimal or no government, the existence of a ceremo-
nial trade ring creates a sense of social solidarity among the "big men" who
are dominant among the Kula traders.75 The trade goods have an oral his-
tory, The name of the original owner and each former possessor is recited
upon its transfer and the salient characteristics of the predecessors are de-
scribed. As a result, diverse people, some of whom are headhunters and
some of whom are cannibals, visit people whom, under normal circum-
stances, they would have reason to fear. Some 500 Dobuan headhunters
71. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 23 J.L. & ECON. 1, 10-
23 (1980).
72. See MacNeill, Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 567(1986). See also I. HOGBIN, THE LEADERS AND THE LED: SOCIAL CONTROL IN WoOEO, NEW
GUINEA 27-28 (1978) [hereinafter I. HOGBIN, THE LEADERS] ("[I]t sustains the network of consan-
guineous ties and helps to preserve it as a living reality.").
73. The Kula ring of the Trobriand Island Melanesia was first analyzed in B. MALINOWSKI,
supra note 68,passim. It has been the subject of numerous papers and conferences. See Landa, The
Enigma of the Kula Ring: Gift-Exchanges and Primitive Law and Order, 3 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
137 (1983). Other exchange systems exist. See, eg., P. BROWN, supra note 24, at 229-33; Bulmer,
Political Aspects of the Moka Ceremonial Exchange System Among the Kyaka People of the Western
Highlands of New Guinea, in MELANESIA: READINGS ON A CULTURE AREA 240 (L. Langness & J.
Wechsler eds. 1971).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 226-28.
75. B. MALINOWSKI, supra note 68, at 274-81; see also Bulmer, supra note 73; MacNeill, supra
note 72.
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visited the island of Sinaketa in 1918 in one expedition.76 Exchanges were
made and no violence occurred.
An interesting thing happens during these expeditions. Much non-Kula
trade (Gimwal) takes place, but never between trading partners. The Kula
partners frequently act as middlemen in the non-Kula trade, which is con-
ducted in a business-like fashion with profitable exchange being the goal of
the parties.7 7 It is here that a formalist economic analysis is most credible.
Yet the social matrix is so complex that a formalist analysis hardly suffices to
explain the rich complexity of a trading ring.
B. Business-Like Exchange
The motivation for most non-ritual exchanges is too simple to require
much elaboration. If a fisherman has a surplus of fish and his inland neigh-
bor has a surplus of sweet potatoes, a trade of fish for sweet potatoes im-
proves the diet and the enjoyment of life of both parties and their families.
In some sense of the word, both are "enriched" by the exchange. It is, how-
ever, controversial whether stone age individuals trade for enrichment in an-
other sense of the word-the making of a profit or the acquisition of wealth
or even whether such individuals will sell their labor. Prominent theorists
have proclaimed that the making of profits, the acquisition of wealth, and
even compensation for one's labor are not goals of primitive humanity. Karl
Polanyi's highly influential work, The Great Transformation, did much to
propagate these conclusions.78
Grand generalizations such as these are difficult to accept when mea-
sured against concrete facts revealed by ethnographers or explorers. First,
consider payment for services. In restating the law of the Kaupauku, Pospi-
sil formulated Rule 106 as follows: "Unless the employer has not [sic] speci-
fied the reward prior to the start of the work the employee has a right to the
customary price (in 1954: 2 Km [a type of seashell] for turning 900 square
meters of forest into garden land)."' 79 He also details two cases in which the
employer attempted to pay the hired hand less than two Km and after the
employee complained to the village "big man" the employer paid the cus-
tomary amount.80 In the Banks Islands, in the Torres Strait between New
76. B. MALINOWSKI, supra note 68, at 376-91.
77. Id. at 362-65.
78. For example, notes to this work read as follows:
(a) The motive of gain is not "natural" to man. "The characteristic feature of primitive
economics is the absence of any desire to make profits from production or exchange."
(Thurnwald, Economics in Primitive Communities, 1932, p. xiii).
(b) To expect payment for labor is not "natural" to man. "Gain, such as is often the stimu-
lus for work in more civilized communities, never acts as an impulse to work under the
original native conditions." (Malinowski, op. cit., p. 156). "Nowhere in uninfluenced prim-
itive society do we find labor associated with the idea of payment." (Lowie, "Social Organ-
ization," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. XIV, p. 14) "Nowhere is labor being
leased or sold" (Thurnwald, Die menschliche Geselschaft, Bk. III, 1932, p. 169).
K. POLANYi, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 269-70 (1964 & 1968 reprint).
79. L. PospisiL, KAPAUKU PAPuANs, supra note 17, at 229; see also A. JENKS, THE BoNToc
IGOROT 136-37 (1905) (five handfuls of unthreshed rice is the daily wage of laborers who help in the
fields).
80. L. POsPIsIL, KAPAUKA PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 229.
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Guinea and Australia, midwives receive a customary fee.3 ' Young men earn
enough to buy their membership into a secret society by helping others to
build a house.8 2
Michael Leahy, making first contact with highlanders in Papua, had no
difficulty in hiring scores of laborers for a gold mining operation on the clear
understanding that no payment would be made unless and until six months
of labor from 7:00 or 7:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., seven days a week, were ren-
dered. Most of the laborers complied with this condition.83 There seems
little doubt that their motive was economic gain.84 In the Northwest Solo-
mons, a form of currency is the imun which "consists of a string of teeth,
either of porpoise (or dolphin) or of flying fox (Terapus) but never both in
the same string."' 85 Among the transactions in which imun is used for pay-
ment are the purchase of handmade goods, compensation for surgical scarifi-
cation and for presiding over rites of passage. 86 Similarly, an Eskimo
woman who helped a blind neighbor commit suicide refused to accept com-
pensation because although she was not a relative, "after all, she was a
friend."' 87 Presumably if she were not a friend, the compensation would
have been expected and taken. Alexander Mackenzie, trailblazer in the Ca-
nadian West, was able to hire a guide for an axe, a knife and a few other
articles. 88 Doubtless this was not a pre-contact transaction, only a first con-
tact transaction. Yet it seemed a natural transaction for both parties.
Among the Yoruks of California, doctors' (shamans') fees were high: one to
two strings of dentalium shells, the price of a slave. 89 Among the Ifugao, go-
betweens who mediate disputes and various contractual disputes are well
paid.90 Among the Kapauku Papuans, a rich man will enter into contracts
81. 1 W. RIVERS, supra note 54, at 50.
82. Id. at 65.
83. For some, the contract was for three months. B. CONNOLLY & R. ANDERSON, FIRST CON-
TACT 222-30 (1987). For some observations on first contacts, see Diamond, The Last First Contacts,
97 NAT. HIST., Aug. 1988, at 28.
84. Upon completion of the six month period, few renewed their contracts. The laborer had
acquired sufficient wealth to pay the bride price for marriage or to enter into the prestigious moka
ceremonial exchange ring. B. CONNOLLY & R. ANDERSON, supra note 83, at 228-29.
85. B. BLACKWOOD, supra note 68, at 448.
I fathom given to pay for making bull-roarer.
I fathom given to old man for making upi or wapi ceremony [rites of passage into adoles-
cence and adulthood].
1 fathom paid for making slit-gong, together with 10 bamboos of paint.
1 fathom given to old woman who performs the operation of cicatrization on tsunaun
[hereditary leader] child.
86. Id. at 449.
87. E. HOEBEL, supra note 31, at 77 (citing Holm, Ethnological Sketch of the Angmassalik
Eskimos, 39 MEDDELELSER OM GREENLAND 74 (1914)).
88. A. MACKENZIE, VOYAGES FROM MONTREAL ON THE RIVER ST. LAURENCE THROUGH
THE CONTINENT OF NORTH AMERICA TO THE FROZEN AND PACIFIC OCEANS; IN THE YEARS
1789-1793, at 34 (1801 & 1966 Readex Microprint).
89. 1 A. KROEBER, supra note 13, at 27. See also id. at 35 ("Shaman's [doctor's] fees were very
high.... Shamans are said to have frequently urged their female relatives to try to acquire 'pains'-
shamanistic powers-because wealth was easily got thereby.").
90. See R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 50-51. Similarly, the ordeal-master in the
Solomons who presides over an ordeal (e.g., swimming a defendant across a channel infested with
alligators) gets a fee measured in porpoise teeth. R. CODRINGTON, THE MELANESIANS: STUDIES IN
THEIR ANTHROPOLOGY AND FOLK-LORE 212-13 (1891 & 1969 reprint). Middlemen who acquire a
canoe for a specific purchaser will take as a fee a year's free use of the canoe. 6 REPORTS OF THE
CAMBRIDGE ANTHROPOLOGICAL EXPEDITIONS TO TORRES STRAIT 186 (1908 & 1971 reprint).
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of agistment whereby others will raise some of his pigs for compensation.
When the pig is about ninety kilograms in weight and is slaughtered the
custodian is paid six kilograms of pork, the head and intestines of the animal
or seven old Kapauku cowrie shells. The price is greater for a sow that
would not be slaughtered.91
One could monotonously add to this list of situations in which primitive
men and women expected and received payment for services. This is not to
say that there is not among Stone Age peoples uncompensated services. Just
as American farmers may have a barn raising party where the entire neigh-
borhood joins in an uncompensated effort, primitives also cooperate without
payment. To conclude that compensation is never expected would be erro-
neous both in the case of the American farmer and the Stone Age person.
Moreover, even where such uncompensated services are rendered, it will
generally be tacitly understood that, when the need arises, reciprocal services
will be rendered.
But profit on the sale of goods? Interest on loans? The acquisition of
wealth? According to Max Weber: "[a] man does not 'by nature' wish to
earn more and more money, but simply to live as he is accustomed to live
and to earn as much as is necessary for that purpose."'92 Again, such a gen-
eralization is rebutted by the facts. Malinowski, tracing trade among the
Trobriand Islands, found that a Sinaketa trader would obtain a basket in
Kobona for twelve coconuts and exchange it in Dobu for twelve coconuts
plus sago plus one belt. He concludes: "[t]hus we see that there is in this
transaction a definite gain obtained by the middleman."'93 The acquisition of
wealth is the primary goal of achievers among Melanesians. 94 Wealth is a
necessary prerequisite to attaining the status of a "big man," a community
leader.95 On the Solomons a medium of exchange is mat-money-long and
narrow woven mats. A large mat is 100 fathoms long. "A middle sized mat
will buy a tusked pig. A rich man will keep fifty mats and more in his house,
hung up and decaying, a proof of ancient wealth. Mat money is also lent at
interest, and so becomes a source of wealth."'96 Thousands of miles away
"[m]oney is prized and establishes influence everywhere in California."' 97
"The consequence is that the Yoruk concerns his life above all else with
property. When he has leisure, he thinks of money." 98 When Alexander
Mackenzie conferred with the Red-Knife Indians at Slave Lake in June
1789, they revealed that they had little incentive to trap beaver because the
Chepewyans who acted as middlemen between them and the Canadians
91. L. POSPISIL, WEST NEw GUINEA, supra note 17, at 12.
92. M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHic AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 60 (1958) (German
original published in 1904-05).
93. B. MALINOWSKI, supra note 68, at 363-64.
94. See, eg., P. BROWN, supra note 24, at 194-203; Finney, Bigfellow Man Belong Business in
New Guinea, in MELANESIA: READINGS ON A CULTURE AREA 315, 319 (L. Langness & J. Wechs-
ler eds. 1971) ("The Gorokans valued wealth highly, and sought the prestige that comes from ac-
cumulating and managing wealth."); Davenport, Red Feather Money, in MELANESIA, READINGS ON
A CULTURE AREA, supra, at 83, 85 ("the islanders buy and sell for the express purpose of making
money").
95. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
96. R. CODRINGTON, supra note 90, at 324.
97. 1 A. KROEBER, supra note 13, at 2.
98. Id.
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either pillaged them or gave them little in payment. They eagerly agreed to
direct and profitable trade, cutting out the middleman.99 Clearly, the
Chepewyans had been marking up the price.
Of what use is wealth to Stone Age humanity? Clearly, it brings power
and prestige. 1°° In societies where a bride price must be paid in order to
marry, a loan to a young man enables him to pay the bride price to the
family of his intended spouse. Such a loan also creates a nexus between the
lender and borrower whereby the latter has an incentive to follow the leader-
ship of the lender. If he is displeased with the borrower, the "big man" will
call in the loan.101 Prestige in Melanesia is acquired by generous lending
and the hosting of generous feasts at which a large number of the host's pigs
are slaughtered and served.' 0 2 It is common for the host to eat nothing at all
at such a feast.103 Sociologist Marshall Sahlins, building on redistribution
theories advanced by Karl Polanyi and others, argues that the big man in
essence acquires wealth on behalf of the community for redistribution in or-
der to provide material substance of the entire population and additionally,
or alternatively, to maintain the big man's power and authority over the
group.104
This is undoubtedly correct, but does not constitute the whole truth.
Consider the wealth of Ekajewaijokaipouga, the richest man in the southern
Kamu Valley of New Guinea, an excellent speaker, a powerful shaman and a
brave warrior who undoubtedly hosted many redistributionary feasts and
whose generosity is well recognized. Nevertheless, his accumulated wealth,
consisting of many wives and a fortune in necklaces, beads, pigs and credits,
is formidable by any standard.10 5 Thus, its acquisition is not merely to serve
99. A. MACKENZIE, supra note 88, at 18.
100. P. BROWN, supra note 24, at 194-97.
101. L. POsPIsIL, WEST NEW GUINEA, supra note 17, at 27.
102. See, eg., P. BROWN, supra note 24, at 215-18; 1. HOGBIN, THE LEADERS, supra note 72, at
151-80; L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 47-52. For redistributive feasts in Ta-
hiti, see E. FERDON, supra note 68, at 223-32.
103. L. POSPISIL, WEST NEW GUINEA, supra note 17, at 31.
104. Speaking more broadly, redistribution by powers-that-be serves two purposes, either of
which may be dominant in a given instance. The practical, logistic function-redistribu-
tion--sustains the community, or community effort, in a material sense. At the same time,
or alternatively, it has an instrumental function: as a ritual of communion and of subordi-
nation to central authority, redistribution sustains the corporate structure itself, that is in a
social sense. The practical benefits may be critical, but, whatever the practical benefits,
chiefly pooling generates the spirit of unity and centricity, codifies the structure, stipulates
the centralized organization of social order and social action.
M. SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS 190 (paperback ed. 1974) (first published 1972).
105. His fortune amounts of five wives, cash amounting to 2,400 Kapauku cowries (repre-
senting a buying power of 120 medium pigs, each weighing 90 kilograms), 3,600 imported
cowries (equivalent to 18 medium pigs), 3,300 beads (equivalent to 5.5 medium pigs), 10
dedege necklaces and 10 pagadau necklaces (equivalent to one medium pig), and 5 axes
(equivalent to one medium pig). In addition to this currency, he own 42 pigs. His credit is
about as extensive as his cash. He bought wives for eleven people who have not yet re-
turned the money. These loans total 1,040 Kapauku cowries (equivalent to 52 medium
pigs), 365 imported cowries (equivalent to two pigs of 70 kilograms of weight each) and
420 beads (equivalent to a 45-kilogram pig). He has a credit with twenty other individuals
amounting to 1,200 Kapauku cowries (equivalent to 60 medium pigs). His generosity is
praised by all the people who know him. The large amount of cash mentioned above is not
simply hoarded. 600 Kapauku cowrie shells and the same number of imported cowrie
shells as well as 3,000 beads were set aside for the sons as their inheritance. Since this
headman imposed a taboo upon this money, which prevents him from using it otherwise
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the communitarian purpose of redistribution.
On the other hand, Charles Darwin noted that among the inhabitants of
Tierra del Fuego "even a piece of cloth given to one is torn into shreds and
distributed; and no one individual becomes richer than another." 10 6 There-
fore, among Stone Age humanity more than one attitude toward wealth
prevails. Yet, the following quotation seems to summarize the attitude of
many Stone Age societies:
Only money enables a man to get married, to gain prestige and become
an influential individual, to conclude best-friendship unions with
respected individuals, and to achieve the highest status of the political
leadership and legal authority. Without money one is called daba-
poor, idle, a not respected individual, who has no standing in the na-
tive society. The closest translation of this word is 'tramp.' 10 7
The enormous diversity between Stone Age attitudes toward compensa-
tion, profit and wealth, makes generalizations such as those propounded by
noted scholars such as Karl Polanyi and Max Weber doubtful indeed.108
III. STRATEGIES FOR INTERGROUP TRADE
Ten thousand years ago the inhabitants of Jericho were making tools of
obsidian, a volcanic glass, which was somehow procured from an identified
source in Anatolia. 109 Because beasts of burden-the horse, the jackass, the
camel-were not domesticated until about five thousand years ago, 110 one
archaeologist speculated that the obsidian was brought to Jericho and other
early Middle Eastern settlements on foot.11 This is doubtless mostly true
but the thought that the obsidian trader might have safely walked the 1,000
kilometers or so from Jericho to the obsidian sites in Anatolia and returned
strains credulity, if one considers the dangers awaiting the traveller. Slav-
ery, 112 headhunting H1 3 and cannibalism1 14 abound in Stone Age societies.
than for the inheritance mentioned, these savings are considered most generous and give
the man additional prestige. The rest of the cash is hidden, and other people do not know
of its existence. I, as the best friend of this man, have been told the exact amount of the
headman's property.
L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 17, at 71 n.4.
106. C. DARWIN, supra note 29, at 245.
107. L. PosPISIL, WEST NEW GUINEA, supra note 17, at 18.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 78, 92.
109. P. SINGH, NEOLOTHIC CULTURES OF WESTERN ASIA 39 (1974). Similarly, obsidian which
had its source in The Tetons of Wyoming is found in pre-Columbian mounds in the Ohio Valley. P.
KOPPER, THE SMITHSONIAN BOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 23 (1986). Archaeologists have
identified trade routes in prehistoric Europe. See J. CLARK, PREHISTORIC EUROPE: THE ECO-
NOMIC BASIS 241 (1952 & 1968 reprint). However, processes and laws governing Stone Age ex-
change are largely beyond the reach of the archaeologist.
110. See D. ELLIS, supra note 56, at 131.
111. P. SINGH, supra note 109, at 39. Part of the transport could have been by boat. J. CLARK,
supra note 109, at 282. Very likely, as in Australia, "[o]bjects were traded only between one tribe
and the next, never from one tribe, through a second tribe's territory, to a third tribe." A. MASSOLA,
THE ABORIGINES OF SOUTH-EASTERN AUSTRALIA 71 (1971). The same kind of trade brought
goods from the coast to the highlands of New Guinea. B. CONNOLLY & R. ANDERSON, supra note
83, at 13. Nonetheless, one or more of the trading strategies discussed in the text infra at notes 116-
43 were likely also applied.
112. As to slavery in Africa, see infra note 116. In North America, see P. DRUCKER, CULTURES
OF THE NORTH PACIFIC COAST 51-52, 75-76, 169-70 (1965); Marquette, Voyages of Marquette, in
THE JESurr RELATIONS 25 (1900 & 1966 reprint) (slave raids by the Illinois); G. WOODCOCK,
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Thefts from passing strangers are not necessarily deemed illegal. 115 While
all of these evils exist, let it quickly be stated that they are not found every-
where. To minimize risks to the trader, various strategies have been em-
ployed by humanity.
A. Silent Trade
Herodotus appears to be the first to have written about "silent" or
"dumb" trade. Some 2,500 years ago he wrote:
The Carthaginians also relate the following: There is a country in
Libya [Africa], and a nation, beyond the Pillars of Hercules, which
they are wont to visit, where they no sooner arrive but forthwith they
unlade their wares, and, having disposed them after an orderly fashion
along the beach, leave them, and, returning aboard their ships, raise a
great smoke. The natives, when they see the smoke, come down to the
PEOPLES OF THE COAST 17, 19, 27, 134, 181, 199 (1977). In New Zealand, see R. LOWIE, supra
note 15, at 346-47. In Mexico, see the reference to the slave-market in Tenochtitlin in B. DfAZ DEL
CASTILLO, THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF MEXICO 1517-1521, at 215-16. (A. Maudslay
trans. 1956); B. DE SAHAG0N, A HISTORY OF ANCIENT MEXICO 43 (Bandalier trans. 1932 & 1971
republication) (written by 1569, published in the nineteenth century).
113. R. BARTON, THE KALINGAS 20, 154-57 (1949 & 1973 reprint); F. WILLIAMS, PAPUANS OF
THE TRANs-FLY 262-91 (1936 & 1969 reprint). For a discussion of the motivation behind headhunt-
ing, see A. JENKS, supra note 79, at 172-83. For a special situation, see R. CODRINGTON, supra note
90, at 297 (to launch a canoe a fresh head must be taken to decorate the prow). Additional head-
hunting references are infra in note 131.
114. There is a school of thought that holds that the existence of cannibals (except where starva-
tion is the alternative or in rare rituals) is a myth. The literature is reviewed in Kolata, Are the
Horrors of Cannibalism Fact-or Fiction?, 17 SMrrHSONIAN 151 (March 1987); Eckholm, Mat is
the Meaning of Cannibalism?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at Cl. This thesis seems as valid as stating
that slavery never existed in this country because there are no living eyewitnesses. Eyewitness quota-
tions as to cannibalism appear in B. BLACKWOOD, supra note 68, at 502-03, and also in F. WIL-
LIAMS, OROKAIVA SOCIETY 171-73 (1930 & 1969 reprint), where one of the witnesses is a Resident
Magistrate. Williams reports: "[tihe reason for cannibalism itself has been given by natives as the
simple desire for good food." Id. at 171. Bernal Diaz Del Castillo had no less a guide than Monte-
zuma to the human slaughterhouse in Tenochtitfin to buttress his first hand reports on cannibalism.
B. DIAz DEL CASTILLO, supra note 112, at 217-25. Human flesh was also fed to the animals of the
Aztec zoo. Id. at 213. A very detailed account of Aztec human sacrifice and cannibalism is given in
B. DE SAHAGON, supra note 112, at 52, 61-62, 76-77. Dr. Chanca, physician to Columbus on his
second voyage to the Caribbean, writes as follows of the Caribs:
They say that man's flesh is so good, that there is nothing like it in the world; and this
is pretty evident, for of the bones which we found in their houses, they had gnawed every-
thing that could be gnawed, so that nothing remained of them, but what from its great
hardness, could be eaten: in one of the houses we found the neck of a man, undergoing the
process of cooking. When they take any boys prisoners, they dismember them, and make
use of them until they grow up to manhood, and then when they wish to make a feast they
kill and eat them; for they say that the flesh of boys and women is not good to eat. Three
of these boys came fleeing to us thus mutilated.
Chanca, Second Voyage of Columbus, in C. COLUMaUS, FOUR VOYAGES TO THE NEW WORLD 18,
31 (1961 reprint of R. Major's 1857 translations originally entitled SELECT LETTERS OF CHRISTO-
PHER COLUMBUS WITH OTHER ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO HIS FOUR VOYAGES TO
THE NEW WORLD). Japanese feasting on beheaded American airmen and others is documented in
LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL, THE KNIGHTS OF BUSHIDO: THE SHOCKING HISTORY OF JAPA-
NESE WAR ATROCITIES 235-40 (1958). A scholarly treatise describes this source as a "one-dimen-
sional shocker but solidly based on IMTFE [International Military Tribunal for the Far East]
evidence." 2 D. BERGAMINI, JAPAN'S IMPERIAL CONSPIRACY 1566 (1971). See also Shepardson,
Pawns of Power, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF POWER 109 (R. Fogelson & R. Adams eds. 1977). It is
unclear whether Japanese cannibalism was related to food shortages among Japanese troops.
115. E.g., E. FERDON, supra note 68, at 226. (Theft is punishable by death, but if strangers enter
the waters of the Society Islands, they are immediately raided and their goods taken with impunity.
Also, it is not deemed improper to steal goods from traders and explorers on land.).
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shore, and, laying out to view so much gold as they think the worth of
the wares, withdraw to a distance. The Carthaginians upon this come
ashore and look. If they think the gold enough, they take it and go
their way; but if it does not seem to them sufficient, they go aboard
ship once more, and wait patiently. Then the others approach and add
to their gold, till the Carthaginians are content. Neither party deals
unfairly by the other: for they themselves never touch the gold till it
comes up to the worth of their goods, nor do the natives ever carry off
the goods till the gold is taken away. 116
This strategy, seemingly so strange, so mysterious, was also employed
in the fur trade between the Vikings and their neighbors to the north and
there are similar reports from Ceylon, the Himalayas and New Mexico, 117 as
well as the Australian interior,1 18 and in diverse islands of the Philippines.1 19
Verrazano found a variation of the silent trade strategy on the shores of
Maine in 1524. The natives stood on the tops of the cliffs, lowering their
goods by ropes and raising the European wares the same way, all the while
insisting that the Europeans keep their distance. 120 One wonders about the
identity of their prior trading partners, who may have come to Maine by sea.
B. Blood Brotherhood
Strangers may be distrusted and may themselves have cause to distrust
potential trading partners. Kinship, however, normally engenders trust.
Where kinship is absent, it may symbolically be created. Dr. Livingstone
reported from south central Africa concerning the Kasendi, a ceremony for
creating a fictional blood relationship:
The hands of the parties are joined... ; small incisions are made
on the clasped hands, on the pits of the stomach of each, and on the
right cheeks and foreheads. A small quantity of blood is taken off from
these points in both parties by means of a stalk of grass. The blood
from one person is put into a pot of beer, and that of a second into
another; each then drinks the other's blood .... The principals in the
performance of "Kasendi" are henceforth considered blood-relations
121
Livingstone thus discusses how a fictional blood relationship may be
116. 3 HERODOTUS, HISTORY, book IV, ch. 196 (G. Rawlinson trans. 1862) (footnote omitted).
In a footnote, the nineteenth century translator of Herodotus indicates that this kind of trade is still
practiced in the interior of Africa. That this should be so is comprehensible, as slavery was endemic
in Africa well into the twentieth century. Internal African slavery preceded the Western slave trade
(E. HARTLAND, supra note 32, at 158; W. PHILLIPS, SLAVERY FROM ROMAN TIMES TO THE EARLY
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE 114-27 (1985)), was present in diverse parts of the continent (SOURCE
BOOK FOR AFRICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, Part I, at 534-40 (Publication 394, Field Museum 1937 &
1968 reprint)) and continued into the twentieth century (R. RATrRAY, ASHANTI LAW AND CONSTI-
TUTION 33-55 (1929 & 1969 reprint); G. SCHWAB, TRIBES OF THE LIBERIAN HINTERLAND 163-64,
439, 441-42 (1947 & 1974 reprint).
117. E. OXENSTIERNA, THE NORSEMEN 120 (C. Hutter trans. 1965).
118. A. MASSOLA, supra note 111, at 63.
119. A. JENKS, supra note 79, at 159.
120. Verrazano, The relation of John Verarzanus a Florentine, of the lande by him discovered in
the name of his Maiestie, written in Diepe the eighth of July 1524, in R. HAKLUYT, DIVERS VOY-
AGES TOUCHING THE DISCOVERIE OF AMERICA 6 (1582 & 1966 reprint).
121. D. LIVINGSTONE, MISSIONARY TRAVELS AND RESEARCHES IN SOUTH AFRICA 525
(1860).
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
formed in Africa but he gives us no information as to how this relationship
may relate to trade. This omission is surprising given the relationship be-
tween blood brotherhood and trade in other societies. In Melanesia, blood
brothers-a relationship that is usually inherited122-are those who partici-
pate in inter-group trade. This is the area where headhunting and cannibal-
ism survived well into modem times. The fictionally related trading partner
in a hostile group provides a certain guarantee of safety while travelling into
its territory. Interestingly, in New York in 1930, Joseph Valachi was made a
member of the Bonanno family by a ceremony resembling the Kasendi de-
scribed by Livingstone.1 23 Herodotus124 and Tacitus report similar ceremo-
nies among the Scythians,125 the Arabs 126 and in the Caucasus. 127 Magellan
underwent a similar ceremony with a Filipino chieftain.128 Not all of these
ceremonies seem to create a fictive family relation. Instead, some appear
merely to pledge faith in a discrete transaction. 129
Judge Posner, one of the few legal theorists who has taken primitive law
into consideration, has concluded that blood brotherhood between trading
partners reduces information costs because the trader may be confident that
he will receive fair and generous treatment.' 30 Clearly, the realization that
one can trade with a particular partner without endangering one's life repre-
sents a significant savings of market transaction costs. To summarize blood
brotherhood in these terms, however, underrates the significance of this
breakthrough in human affairs whereby life is secured, peace attained and
exchange facilitated.
C. The Professional Trader
The Torres Strait, which separates New Guinea from Australia, is
dotted with inhabited islands. These islanders are dependent on New
Guinea for many products including arrows, bird of paradise feathers,
drums, stone-headed clubs and especially canoes. The situs of the trade is
122. On all these islands and at the villages on the [New Guinea] mainland that they visited
every Eastern man had a friend, tebud le, who regarded him as a brother. These friend-
ships once formed were never broken; they were hereditary, having come down from past
ages from father to son. A man may never have seen his tebud le, but his name and family
history were as well known to him as his own, and he passed on the pedigree to each of his
own sons. On visiting the islands the tebud le would be welcomed and entertained.
I TORRES STarr, supra note 54, at 183. See also I. Hogbin, A Guadalcanal Society: The Kaoka
Speakers 49 (1914 & 1964 reprint); I. HOGBRN, THE LEADERS, supra note 72, at 29-30 (1978)
(Wogeo Island-generally the sons of trading partners became trading partners themselves); B.
MALINOWKSI, supra note 68, at 275-81 (young men buy into the Kula partnerships, usually financed
by their fathers); Gallin & Gallin, Sociopolitical Power and Sworn Brother Groups in Chinese Society,
in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF POWER 89 (R. Fogelson & R. Adams eds. 1977).
123. P. MAAS, THE VALACHI PAPERS 97 (paperback ed. 1969).
124. HERODOTUS, HISTORY, book I, ch. 74 (G. Rawlinson trans. 1862) (Lydians and the Medes
make an oath of peace by making a flesh wound in their arms and each sucks a portion of the other's
blood.).
125. TAcITuS, THE ANNALS OF IMPERIAL ROME, book XII, ch. 48.
126. HERODOTUS, HISTORY, book III, ch. 87 (G. Rawlinson trans. 1862).
127. TACITUS, supra note 125, at book XII, ch. 47.
128. 1 A. PIGAPETTA, MAGELLAN'S VOYAGE AROUND THE WORLD 137 (1906) (. Robertson
translation of eyewitness account of Magellan's 1519-21 voyage).
129. See Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form,
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 65-66 (1974).
130. Posner, supra note 71, at 26.
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the delta of Fly River where the inhabitants are headhunters. The Torres
Strait islanders are also headhunters. 131 Thus, there are obvious diplomatic
problems. The solution is that almost all trade to the Western islands is in
the hands of the residents of one island, Saibai.' 3 2 Trade with the eastern
islanders is through one island, Erub.133 Both the Saibai and Erub islanders
are permitted by their trading partners on the coast of New Guinea to pass
through their territory to go on headhunting expeditions into the interior.1 34
Thus, presumably the Saibai and Erub traders trade under a grant of immu-
nity and likely deal with blood brothers in New Guinea.135
Such grants of immunity to traders seem to be common. The
Comanches were an Indian tribe that, unlike many others, had minimal or
no government. They generally sought to massacre or enslave every non-
Comanche with whom they came into contact.136 Josiah Gregg, a business-
man and trader, wrote:
The Santa Fe caravans have generally avoided every manner of
trade with the wild Indians [Comanches] for fear of being treacher-
ously dealt with during the familiar intercourse which necessarily en-
sues. This I am convinced is an erroneous impression; for I have
always found, that savages are much less hostile to those with whom
they trade, than to any other people. They are emphatically fond of
traffic; and being anxious to encourage the whites to come among
them, instead of committing depredations upon those with whom they
trade, they are generally ready to defend them against every enemy. 137
Similarly, a Sioux war party seized Father Louis Hennepin, a mission-
ary on an exploration expedition of the upper reaches of the Mississippi, and
two French canoemen. Hennepin describes the debate among the Sioux
warriors on the question of whether the three captives should be killed. One
chief urged execution, "but those who liked European goods were much dis-
posed to preserve us, so as to attract other Frenchmen there and get iron,
which is extremely precious in their eyes."'138 They were not killed but were
"adopted."'139
131. 5 TORRES STarT, supra note 54, at 295, 298-307; 6 TORRES STRAIT, supra note 90, at 189-
91; see also F. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 11, 26, 41, 55, 169, 243, 262-91.
132. 5 TORRES STRAIT, supra note 54, at 295.
133. 6 TORRES STRAIT, supra note 90, at 185.
134. 5 TORRES STRAIT, supra note 54, at 295.
135. See supra text accompanying note 122.
136. The Comanches whipped and drove the Apaches from the southern Plains. They
stalemated the Spanish. They decimated the pueblo of Pecos. They ranged far below the
Rio Grande on slave- and booty-taking raids into Old Mexico. They blocked the westward
expansion of the Texas frontier for several decades. They became 'The Spartans of the
Prairies.' They were rough, tough, aggressive and militant individualists. They gave
trouble to all their enemies and to themselves.
E. HOEBEL, supra note 31, at 129 (This summary was based on E. WALLACE & E. HOEBEL, THE
COMANCHES: LORDS OF THE SOUTH PLAINS (1952).).
137. 2 J. GREGG, COMMERCE ON THE PRAIRIES 46 (1844 & 1966 Readex Microprint); accord
Appendix, Z. PIKE, SOURCES OF THE MISSISSIPPI AND THE WESTERN LOUISIANA TERRITORY 62
(1810 & 1966 Readex Microprint) (Sioux are the most warlike in their area but traders feel secure in
their territory.).
138. L. HENNEPIN, supra note 70, at 211.
139. Id. at 224-25. One finds many references to the adoption by American Indians of those of
their captives whom they did not slay. Yet, in the reports of those who were "adopted," it seems
clear that the adoptee was not deemed to be an equal of the adoptor's own progeny. Hennepin was
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In 1527, Alvar Nufiez Cabeza de Vaca embarked as an officer of an
expedition that was dispatched to conquer Florida. The expedition was un-
successful. He and a few other survivors made their way to Texas where
they were enslaved. After much suffering and privation he carved out a role
for himself as a trader which led to his freedom. The bands of Indians in the
area were all at war with each other. As a member of no tribe, he was feared
by no one. He wrote:
The Indians would beg me to go from one quarter to another for
things of which they have need; for in consequence of incessant hostili-
ties, they cannot traverse the country nor make many exchanges. With
my merchandise and trade, I went into the interior as far as I pleased,
and travelled along the coast forty or fifty leagues.140
Cabeza de Vaca invented a role for himself as a professional trader. It
would seem that others have created the same role. The evidence is, how-
ever, elusive. For example, trade in interior areas of Northern Luzon is
often conducted in the language of a coastal people, the Ilokano, although at
a time when an ethnographer noticed this phenomenon, native Ilokano
speakers were afraid to penetrate the interior. Nevertheless, he also noted
that at an earlier time Ilokanos and Chinese who spoke Ilokano used to enter
the interior, bringing with them iron, brass, cloth, cotton and other trade
goods.141 One suspects that Ilokano speaking traders had been made wel-
come but that some traumatic violation of the immunity later accorded pro-
fessional traders had occurred. Headhunting, an indigenous practice, 142 was
a possible cause of the violation. For example, among the Ibilao, a neighbor-
ing people, "no man may marry who has not first taken a head."' 143 In such
a society, an undefended trader is a tempting target.
D. Openness
Not all primitive peoples are afraid of foreign contact. Verrazano, who
found fear and discourtesy on the shores of Maine,144 had recently been
greeted with joy in New York.' 45 On July 8, 1534, Jacques Cartier ap-
proached the St. Lawrence River. The Indians came to greet him in such
large numbers that he was afraid. He shot off cannons to scare the Indians
away, but such was their friendly curiosity that they quickly returned.' 46
When a party from the ship went on land, the natives literally traded the
assigned women's work-barbering. L. HENNEPIN, supra note 70, at 223. Isaac Joques was as-
signed menial work-gathering firewood. THE JESUIT RELATIONS AND ALLIED DOCUMENSI:
TRAVELS AND EXPLORATIONS OF THE JESurr MISSIONARIES IN NEW FRANCE, 1610-1791, at 196-
98 (E. Kenton ed. 1954). Cabeza de Vaca and his colleagues were clearly and cruelly treated as
slaves. A. CABEZA DE VACA, RELATION OF ALVAR Nu&Ez CABEZA DE VACA 101-05 (Smith
trans. 1871 & 1966 Readex Microprint).
140. A. CABEZA DE VACA, supra note 139, at 85 (Objects of trade were shells for cutting tools
and decorations, peyote, skins, ochre, canes to make arrows, flint for arrowheads, and deer tassels
presumably for fish bait.).
141. A. JENKS, supra note 79, at 157-58.
142. See supra text accompanying note 114. The unprovoked killing of traders is recorded in R.
BARTON, THE KALINGAS, supra note 113, at 154.
143. A. JENKS, supra note 79, at 174.
144. See supra text accompanying note 121.
145. Verrazano, supra note 120, at A5, B.
146. J. CARTIER, A SHORTE AND BRIEFE NARRATION OF THE TWO NAVIGATIONS AND DIs-
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clothes off their backs for hatchets, knives, beads and the like.' 47 Similarly
Jean Ribault's reception in 1562 at the mouth of Florida's St. John's River
can best be described as a celebration. 148 It is interesting that while strate-
gies of "silent trade, .... blood-brotherhood" and professional trading have
been invented in very diverse geographical areas, they were not in use in
most of the Atlantic Coast of North America. Indeed, the Indians assisted
the Pilgrims in making their settlement. 149 This openness to the visitors
from the East undoubtedly contributed to the destruction of Native Ameri-
can societies. Montezuma in fear and trembling saw Cortez and his men as
gods and treated them accordingly,150 thus unwittingly assisting the destruc-
tion of the Aztec state and its culture.
E. Confusion
When in the 1930s Michael Leahy and his entourage of coastal people
entered the densely populated highlands of New Guinea in areas where no
white man had been seen or heard of, the reaction of the highlands' inhabit-
ants was that of total confusion. Some groups welcomed them as returning
ancestors;151 others did not know whether to treat them as good or bad spir-
its or as invasive intruders.152 All soon learned the power of the gun.'53
Most were willing to exchange food,' 54 sexual favors' 55 and labor for trade
goods.
In 1822, a British exploratory expedition joined an Arab trading cara-
van departing from Tripoli and heading for the vicinity of Lake Tchad.
When nearing their destination, the English witnessed a system of mutual
plunder between the caravan and the natives. On the one hand, animals
straying from the caravan were instantly carried off and messengers to the
inhabitants was stripped and tied to a tree. On the other hand, when the
caravan came in sight of a village the inhabitants fled with their possessions.
Major Denham reported that when the Arabs caught up with one fleeing
group, "[i]n a few seconds the camels were eased of their loads, and the poor
women and girls stripped to the skin."' 5 6
Although neither the Arabs nor the natives of Tchad were in the Stone
Age, this episode is reported here to illustrate the confusion and mistrust
shown between peoples who have not established a strategy for trading with
others whom they have reason to fear.
COVERIES TO THE NORTHWEST PARTES CALLED NEWE FRAUNCE 15-16 (1580 & 1966 reprint sub
nom. NAVIGATIONS TO NEWE FRAUNCE).
147. Id. at 16-17.
148. J. RIBAULT, The true and last discoverie of Florida made by Captaine John Ribault in the
Yeere 1562, in R. HAKLUYT, supra note 120, at F-F5.
149. 1 W. BRADFORD, HISTORY OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION 1620-47, at 198-213, 215, 219
(1912) (manuscript completed in 1650).
150. C. BURLAND, MONTEZUMA: LORD OF THE AZTECS 179-226 (1973).
151. B. CONNOLLY & R. ANDERSON, supra note 83, at 23-29, 3443.
152. Id. at 197-98. A similar disordered reception .greeted Mackenzie's party by Deguthee
Dinees just south of Eskimo country. A. MACKENZIE supra note 88, at 51.
153. B. CONNOLLY & R. ANDERSON, supra note 83, at 69-72, 100-02, 188-89, 191, 196, 197-200,
and 205-14.
154. See id. at 120-22 for one of many trading episodes recounted in this book.
155. Id. at 142, 235-47. This kind of trade may have been introduced by Leahy's men. Id.
156. W. TAYLOR, THE FLAMING TORCH IN DARKEST AFRICA 135-36 (1896).
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IV. LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE
A. Forms of Contract
Barter is a common form of exchange in primitive societies. In the
Solomons there is a regular trade between coastal villagers and inland resi-
dents, the former supplying fish and the latter taro, an edible root. The ex-
changes are contemporaneous. 157 This typifies much of primitive
exchange.15 8 There are, however, more complex bartering systems. For ex-
ample, an early twentieth century observer in the Solomons noted an intri-
cate web of bartering transactions:
A chain of exchanges which came to my notice is interesting as
showing the ramifications of the system. The people of Petats obtained
some pots at Malasang in exchange for women's hoods. The pots they
bartered to the people of Lontis in exchange for taro. The Lontis peo-
ple used the pots to pay for pigs, which they intended to sell, as oppor-
tunity offered for ceremonial currency made of shell disks (beroan),
which was destined eventually to form part of the property changing
hands in respect of a marriage.15 9
Similar systems are recorded elsewhere. 16°
Necessities are not the only subject of trade. 161 The aesthetic impulse is
strong. Decorative jewelry and cosmetics are often objects of exchange. 162
There is a surprisingly extensive trade in intellectual property. Songs,
poems, magical incantations, and choreography are frequently deemed to be
private property which can be sold or licensed. 163
157. B. BLACKWOOD, supra note 68, at 440-41.
158. E.g., fish for bananas. E. FERDON, supra note 68, at 221. "In the morning the dancing
ground turns into a trading ground. The items most frequently exchanged include axes, bird plumes,
shell ornaments, an occasional baby pig, and in former times, native salt." Rappaport, supra note
25, at 79.
159. B. BLACKWOOD, supra note 68, at 445-46.
160. E.g., R. CdDRINGTON, supra note 90, at 297-98; B. MALINOWSKi, supra note 68, at 166-
194.
161. Some of these objects of trade are mentioned supra at note 140. The importance of trade to
primitive man is illustrated by the myth of Mafofo, a culture hero whose principal accomplishment
was the inauguration of trading voyages. I. HOGaiN, THE ISLAND, supra note 48, at 42-49. The
importance of trade in this society is shown by the following passage:
The chief [imported] items are pots.... and large garden-baskets woven from grasses
.... Other articles ... include shell scrapers, lime spoons of cassowary bone, tobacco and
yams. Practically all the ornaments worn... - shell rings, usually too small for bracelets,
worn in armlets and leg-bands, fibre shoulder straps sewn over either with shell discs or
ground cowries, hair ornaments of dogs' teeth and ground cowries, loose ground cowries
for sewing to fibre petticoats, dyed rattan, bird of paradise plumes, crests of Goura (or
"guria") pigeons and cockatoo feathers, as well as cosmetics, such as red and white paint
(red ochre and pipeclay?)....
The exports of Wogeo in greatest demand are fishing nets and nuts.... Canoes are
occasionally bartered away, and on a couple of occasions villages on the mainland have
"bought" Wogeo dances. I understand that amongst themselves the mainlanders trade
regularly in dances. Magic too is sometimes exchanged for material goods. Wogeo love
magic is said to be better than that from any other place, while the islanders themselves
have obtained a good many spells to cause diseases from elsewhere.
Hogbin, Trading Expeditions in Northern New Guinea, in 5 OCEANIA 375 (1935) (footnote omitted).
162. E.g., red paint (B. BLACKWOOD, supra note 68, at 444-45); red ochre (A. CAHEzA DE
VACA, supra note 139, at 85-86).
163. R. LowiE, supra note 15, at 235-43; A. MASSOLA, supra note 111, at 64; see also supra note
161.
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Although barter is common, unilateral contracts also pervade Stone
Age societies. 164 Canoes are commonly sold on credit with payments
stretched out over a period of three165 or more months. 166 Pigs are sold on
credit.167 Loans at interest are common.1 68 Real property is mortgaged. 169
Leases of cultivable land are made. 170 Land is sold in installments. 171
Water rights are sold.172 Indeed, debt is an organizing principle of many
Stone Age societies.173
Bilateral contracts-those requiring the future performance of obliga-
tions on both sides-appear to be less common. Pigs are let out on contracts
to be raised and fattened for the owner with executory duties on both
sides. 174 Sales of canoes frequently involve canoes made to order under
what would appear to be bilateral contracts, but the observers of these trans-
actions do not inform us of the consequences of non-performance of the
agreement by the seller or of the buyer's refusal to take delivery. The conse-
quences of the refusal to pay after delivery are well documented.1 75 In all
the literature this author perused-excepting for engagements to marry176-
only one report of damages awarded for breach of an agreement that is en-
tirely executory on both sides surfaced. R.F. Barton reports that among the
Ifugao, "[t]he breaking of a contract to sell renders the breaker of the con-
tract liable for damages only in case he took the initiative in making the con-
tract. Damages paid for the breaking of a contract to sell, are called
hogop."177 Moreover, only the seller and never the buyer is liable for these
damages which, depending on the magnitude of the transaction, will be a
large or small pig, a blanket or a chicken.17 8 The suspicion is strong that
164. A unilateral contract is a binding agreement which obligates only one party. For example,
X states to Y, "if you lend me $100, I will repay it within thirty days." Y bands X $100. X is
obligated by his promise. Y was never under any obligation. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1-10, 2-10 (3d ed. 1987).
165. 1 TORRES STRArr, supra note 54, at 296.
166. R. LOWIE, supra note 15, at 348-49 (five payments in Samoa).
167. L. PospisI, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 211-17.
168. R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 49-50; P. DRUCKER, CULTURES OF THE
NORTH PACIFIC COAST 61 (1965). Surprisingly under Kapauku law, "it depends upon the will of
the debtor whether interest will be paid. Although immoral, non-payment of promised interest is
not punishable." L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 224.
169. R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 37-38.
170. L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 218-19.
171. R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 38-39.
172. Id. at 53.
173. "Where there is no debt, there are no relationships. Debts must be allowed to run between
groups, for it is this which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships." Peters, Some
Structural Aspects of the Feud Among the Camel-herding Bedouin in Cyrenaica, 37 AFRICA 267 (July
1967), quoted in Stoljar, supra note 28, at 270 n.9; see L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 17,
at 69.
174. L. POsPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 217-18.
175. E.g., R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 92-100; A. KROEBER, supra note 13, at 32-
33; L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 209-29.
176. This discussion deliberately avoids the subjects of bride price and sister exchange. The
family law aspects of such transactions require specialized treatment. Others, however, disagree. At
least one observer indicates that the people she studied regard the bride price "as a financial transac-
tion exactly on the same lines as any other purchase .. " B. BLACKWOOD, supra note 68, at 97.
For an instance where damages for breach of contract to marry are payable, see R. BARTON, IFUGAO
LAW, supra note 5, at 97 (Gumangan's Case).
177. R. BARTON, IFuGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 52 (emphasis in original).
178. Id.
19891
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
non-lawyer observers of neolithic peoples have not been terribly interested in
the question of the availability of damages for breach of an agreement that is
entirely executory on both sides. We do know that primitives make and
keep promises, 179 but we do not know whether they are binding in law prior
to the promisee's performance of his side of the bargain.
Among the Kapauku, a sale of personal property may be rescinded at
will on the day of the sale or the next day subject to mutual duties of restitu-
tion. 180 Contracts not fully performed on both sides may be rescinded until
performance is complete subject to mutual duties of restitution.181 Afortiori,
among this group a wholly executory contract would not be deemed binding.
The Kapauku have developed rules for risk of loss, as have the Kal-
inga. 182 It is almost certainly true that other agricultural peoples have devel-
oped rules governing the life and death of crops and farm animals. For
example, among the Kapauku the seller of a pig assumes the risk of loss of
its premature death, but is entitled to its carcass and must make restitution
of the price. 183 The buyer of land assumes the risk of the destruction of a
growing crop, 184 but if the subject matter of the sale is not land, but the
crop, the risk of destruction by weather or invading pigs is on the vendor. 185
Among the Kalingas of Luzon, the risk of loss by the destruction of a field
by landslide or the like is on the seller until delivery of possession. 186 In
sales of water buffaloes (carabaos) it is customary for the parties to agree to
"a point beyond which, should the animal fall over a cliff. . ., the buyer will
bear the loss and inside of which the purchase price will be refunded."' 187
These rules on risk of loss are not presented as a study of the subject but to
point out that Neolithic humanity is capable of subtlety and precision in
coping with recurring problems in the performance of contracts.
Liability for breach normally results in a duty to make restitution or to
pay the agreed price. In common law terms, indebitatus assumpsit in both
its contractual and quasi-contractual garbs dominates remedies for breach.
But protection of the reliance interest by elongation of the chain of causation
is also evident. Consider two incidents recorded among the Yoruk Indians.
The first involved a ferryman. A Yoruk of Kenek was ferrying an acquain-
tance. While thus engaged, the ferryman's house was destroyed by fire. The
acquaintance was required to pay for the entire loss. If the owner had not
been engaged in ferrying, he might have been at home and probably could
179. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, supra note 19, at 4 (" 'Say yes, and we will promise you to
go to war against the Crows, wherever they may be' .... 'I accept' the bereaved old man finally
answered." The promised war took place.); see also id. at 13-15; Mackenzie, reporting on his travels
in Saskatchewan, states "[i]f a contract is entered into and solemnized by the ceremony of smoking,
it never fails of being faithfully fulifiled." A. MACKENZIE, supra note 88, at ciii. The nature of these
contracts is not revealed, but Mackenzie was engaged in opening up fur trading relations with previ-
ously uncontacted tribes.
180. L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 208, 215 (rule 89).
181. Id. at 208.
182. R. BARTON, IFUGAo LAW, supra note 5, at 51 (discusses risk of loss as between principal
and agent).
183. L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 208.
184. Id. at 210.
185. Id. at 211.
186. R. BARTON, THE KALINGAS, supra note 113, at 114.
187. Id. at 113.
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have extinguished the blaze.188
Note that in the conceptual framework of the common law there was no
breach of contract. Nonetheless, but for the ferryman's performance of the
agreement, his house might not have burned down. Perhaps, however, it is
wrong to look at this as a contract case at all because, despite the generally
acquisitive nature of their society, it is an imperative of Yoruk law that
"[firee ferriage must at all times be rendered."'189
The second case is clearly contractual. The anthropologist's full report
of the case follows:
An American at Rekwoi engaged a number of Indians to trans-
port stores from Crescent City. In the surf and rocks at the dangerous
entrance to the Klamath a canoe was lost and four natives drowned.
Compensation was of course demanded; when it was not forthcoming,
the American was ambushed and killed by the brother of one of the
dead men. According to one version, the goods were Government
property, and the trader responsible only for their transport. The Indi-
ans' claims are said to have been forwarded to the Government, but
while officials pondered or refused, the Indians, losing hope of a settle-
ment, fell back on the revenge which alone remained to them. 190
Once again, no contractual breach occurred. However, the men would not
have died but for their labor in performance of the contract. The other con-
tracting party must pay blood money or suffer death.
The Kapauku also employ a similar stretched-out sense of the chain of
causation. A contract case will be discussed later,19' but a homicide case
perhaps will better illustrate this notion of causation. By way of preface to
the case, in Kapauku thinking an unmarried woman is under the control of
her father or eldest brother. 92 The family head, often the eldest son when
the father retires, determines whom she will marry and is entitled to an
agreed bride price from her spouse. In the case reported below an older
brother had instructed his sister and the "defendant" to refrain from court-
ing each other as he disliked the "defendant." They both disobeyed.
Her brother became so enraged by her disobedience that he shot
her in the thigh, without intending to hurt her seriously. However, the
arrow severed an artery and the girl bled to death....
Outcome: Public opinion condemned the brutal act of the
brother. However, the authority [a village big man], complying with
law, sentenced the courting boy to pay 120 [cowries], one pig, one
dedege necklace, and some beads to the brother. The latter's right to
control the courting of his sister, her disobedience, as well as the
lover's interference over the protests of the brother were the reasons
behind the decision. 193
188. 1 A. KROEBER, supra note 13, at 35.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 28. A similar case is reported in R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 73, but
there strict liability for the drownings applies only because hosts of "glorified general welfare feasts
to which great numbers of people come are responsible for wounds or deaths that occur at these
feasts." Id. at 72-73.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 237-41.
192. L. Pospisn., KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 132-35.
193. Id. at 151.
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The brother who mortally wounded his sister is under no liability, be-
cause he is the only party legally aggrieved by her loss. Although the
"courting boy" was made to pay a heavy indemnity for the woman's death,
there was no talk of the death penalty being exacted. The Kapauku distin-
guish between intentional and unintentional homicide on the question of
remedies and penalties.19 4
There is some evidence that, among the Kapauku, intention to breach
or the lack thereof, plays a role in determining remedy in contract cases.
Here are two cases as reported by Pospisil.195 In each of them the breach
was unintentional and the aggrieved party therefore refrained from insisting
upon full legal redress.
Case #1:
Facts: Pigs destroyed a crop of sweet potatoes which had been
sold.
Outcome: The seller had to return only 3 Km of the 5 Km origi-
nally paid because the plaintiff felt sorry for the vendor.
Case #2:
Facts: The defendant sold a crop of sweet potatoes to the plain-
tiff. Shortly afterwards, pigs invaded the garden and completely de-
stroyed the crop which had been purchased for 3 Km.
Outcome: The authority decided on the return of the price. The
buyer, however, was satisfied with just 2 Km and left 1 Km to the
seller because he felt sorry for the man's loss.
Although the law required restitution in full, the breaches were uninten-
tional and, thus, engendered no feeling of outrage. Therefore, the claimants
did not take full advantage of their remedies. If these cases are representa-
tive of community sentiment as to the no-fault liability of a seller, it likely
presages a change in law.
B. Collection Methods
When it is determined that a debt or damages must be paid, or restitu-
tion must be made, it sometimes happens that the debtor does not have the
means of payment. In such circumstances primitive humanity has developed
various strategies. A common rule holds the kinship group, the residential
group, or both, collectively responsible. 196 A second strategy is corporal
punishment. Aspects of both appear in the following Kapauku case:
Facts: The defendant [Ko Wed] frequently borrowed quantities
of currency and failed to pay his debts. Also, he killed a male pig and
194. L. PospIsIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 149-52. As did the Cheyenne, K.
LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, supra note 19, at 137-39.
195. L. POSPisIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 211 (The case reported as Case I in the
text is Case 5 in the original.) Although intention plays a role in Kapauku law, it plays none in the
law of the Yoruk. As illustrated by both of the Yoruk cases discussed above, see supra text accom-
panying notes 188-90. "Intent or ignorance, malice or negligence are never a factor. The fact and
amount of damage are alone considered." 1 A. KROEBER, supra note 13, at 20. At the other end of
the spectrum, Ifugao law recognizes no liability for a homicide unless the killer acted intentionally or
carelessly. R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 58; but see the Ifugao exception stated supra
in note 190; see also R. BARTON, THE KALINGAS, supra note 113, at 220-26.
196. L. PospismL, KAPAUKu PAPUANs, supra note 17, at 223-24, 231-32; R. BARTON, IPUGAO
LAW, supra note 5, at 94.
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promised to pay 15 Km for it. When the creditor came to collect the
debt, however, Ko Wed tried again to avoid payment by making
promises. This time the creditor insisted on immediate payment. To
avoid intervillage disputes, Kug, the village authority, paid the debt.
Outcome: To stop this irresponsible behavior of the culprit, Kug
decided to use a public reprimand and beating as a means of correc-
tion. The first paternal parallel cousins of the defendant became the
executioners of the corporal punishment and beat Ko Wed with sticks
for three days. During this period the authority helped with the public
reprimand. 19 7
Because the village is collectively responsible for its resident's debts, failure
to pay the creditor could result in a foray by the creditor's kin, armed with
bows and arrows, to levy execution on property of anyone in the village. 198
To avoid this, Kug, the village "big man," paid the debt. He caused Ko
Wed's cousins to administer corporal punishment, thus avoiding retaliation
by Ko Wed's kin against the kin of the "executioners." Worse for the de-
fendant, Kug propelled the villagers into three days of public shaming of the
culprit. 199 This is not the end of the story because Ko Wed now owes fifteen
cowries to Kug.20°
Another alternative is a physical attack upon the debtor. At least
among the Kapauku such an attack discharges the debt. 20 1 Among the Ifu-
gao "non-payment of a debt when there is the ability to pay it, and after
many and repeated demands have been made in the proper manner for it,
justifies infliction of the death penalty. '20 2 The death penalty is decreed by
the creditor and his kin and not by the State, because there is no State,20 3
nor are there "big men." It is a solution of last resort because it may be the
starting point of a feud between families. 20 4
Similarly, among the Ifugao, seizure of property by the creditor is a
recognized right. The following is a list of items usually seized: gongs, rice-
wine jars, carabaos, gold beads, rice fields, children, wives. 20 5 For debts and
minor torts, the property seized may be that of a neighbor of the debtor. A
case will illustrate how the neighbor may profit by such a seizure of his
goods:
Bahni of Tupplak spoke scornfully of Bumidang of Palao. Some
time subsequently he sent a man to buy carabaos in Nueva Vizcaya.
The man bought two, and returned on the homeward journey, travel-
ling through Palao. Bumidang took one of the carabaos away from
him there, and with his kin, killed it and ate it. Bahni with his kin
shortly afterward went to the house of Dulauwan of Bangauwan, a
neighboring village, and stole away with Dulauwan's carabao. Du-
197. L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 222-23 (In this quotation the name of
the defendant has been changed to correct a probable clerical error.).
198. See id. at 223 (Case 124), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 237-41.
199. On the severity of this punishment, see infra text accompanying note 239.
200. See L. PosPism, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 225 (Case 126).
201. Id. at 219 (Rule 99); but see id. at 220 (Case 118).
202. R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 93.
203. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
204. R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 93.
205. Id. at 93.
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lauwan followed after them, hotfoot, and was given as patang [interest
paid in advance] three pigs, and told to collect his carabao from
Bumidang. Dulauwan gathered together a great host of kinsmen and
neighbors, descended on Bumidang's house, and camped there de-
manding three carabaos. To show that they meant to get them, they
helped themselves to rice needed for their daily food from Bumidang's
granary. Bumidang was unable to get together a sufficient force to
frighten away his guests, and accordingly he paid the three
carabaos. 206
If a wife or child is seized she or he is held for ransom until the debt is
paid.20 7
Another option, in some societies, is enslavement of the debtor. This
was the practice among the Yoruks, as illustrated by the following case:
A bastard, in burning over a hillside, once set fire to certain valu-
ables which a rich man of Sregon had concealed in the vicinity. He
was unable to compensate and became the other's slave. Subsequently
the Sregonite killed a Tolowa, and transferred the slave as part of the
blood money. This was long after the American was in the land; but
the slave knew that if he attempted to avail himself of the protection of
the white man's law, he would be liable under the native code and
probably ambushed and killed by his master. He therefore arranged
with him to purchase his liberty, apparently with money earned by
services to Americans. 208
Debt slavery, often called pawning of a human, has been a common phe-
nomenon in various parts of Europe and Africa.20 9 Slavery of this kind,
however, appears alien to the Melanesian region.2 10
Death does not appear to be an appropriate penalty for debt or breach
of contract 21 ' unless the contract or its breach causes death. 2 12 As indicated
above, the Yuroks employ shamans as physicians at very high fees.2 13 So do
other California Indians. The fees may be justified by the risks of the profes-
sion. If the patient dies, the survivors may deem the physician to be respon-
sible for the death. Therefore, "[m]any a central and south California doctor
has met this fate [retribution]," being "waylaid in the brush and choked to
death., 2 14
The remedy of "homesitting," attributed by legal historian Sir Henry
Maine to ancient Aryan law, the assumed common heritage of Indo-Euro-
pean peoples, has its cognates elsewhere as well. He describes the well-
known ancient Irish practice whereby the debtor would sit on the doorstep
206. Id. at 97.
207. Id. at 99-100.
208. 1 A. KROEBER, supra note 13, at 33.
209. It is not necessarily the debtor who is pawned. Frequently it is the son or daughter of the
debtor who is pawned to the creditor. R. RATrRAY, supra note 116, at 47-55; G. SCHWAB, supra
note 116, at 163-64, 439. The ancient Irish law allowed for the pawning of a son. H. MAINE,
LECTURES ON THE EARLY HmSTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 282 (1888). For analogous rules under Ger-
manic Law, see Berger, From Hostage to Contract, 35 ILL. L. RaV. 154, 157-58 (1940).
210. See, eg., L. PospismL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 77-78.
211. But see supra text accompanying note 202 and infra text accompanying notes 235-37.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 190, 202.
213. See supra text accompanying note 89.
214. 1 A. KROEBER, supra note 13, at 36.
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of his creditor while fasting (a precursor of the hunger strike) and which had
a counterpart in Saxon England where the debtor would sit on the doorstep
to imprison the owner or members of his family until the debt was paid.
Closer to the Irish practice were practices in Persia and India.215 Outside of
the Indo-European family of peoples, similar strategies are also employed.
The following incident took place in Luzon and is a common form of debt
collection there. Pedro sold a gong to Tobagon for the promised payment of
three carabaos.
Two years later, the debt was still unpaid, so one day Pedro called
five companions and went to... Tobagon's house and informed him
that they intended to stay until they led that carabao away.
After a day or two, Tobagon's wife told him that he would better
borrow from his relatives and pay because she never saw anybody eat
like Pedro and his companions, and if they should stay much longer all
their rice would have been used up, since they had only 3 uyons left for
the rest of the year. Accordingly, Tobagon went to his eldest brother,
Andomang, and explained the situation saying that, unless Andomang
should lend him his carabao, he, Tobagon and family, would be
doomed to starvation soon, because their rice was vanishing fast. So
Andomang "was convinced."
On the fourth day of their stay, Pedro and his companions led
away their carabao, praising their host's hospitality highly. Tobagon
paid Andomang later.
Comment by informant (Pangat Gasatan): "But the best method
of sit-down collection is to stop at the house of an influential man
among the debtor's relatives, so that you will be helped by him. In
such cases the debtor is ashamed before his influential kinsman, so he
is obliged to borrow from his brothers and sisters.216
While it is conceivable that housesitting whether in its Irish, Filipino or
other form is the common inheritance of all those peoples that utilize it, or
has diffused from a center where it was invented, it seems probable that it
has been reinvented at various times by different individuals in different
societies.
V. DISPUTE RmSOLUTION
Many Stone Age societies are organized into States with State-run insti-
tutions of dispute resolution. However, as indicated at the beginning of this
Article, some societies are stateless.217 The varieties of dispute resolution
methods in the latter kind of societies are the focus of this part of the Article.
A.L. Kroeber, one of our foremost anthropologists, succinctly described
dispute resolution among the Yoruks as follows:
It may be asked how the Yurok executed their law without polit-
ical authority being in existence. The question is legitimate; but a
profounder one is why we insist on thinking of law only as a function
215. H. MAINE, supra note 209, at 295-305.
216. R. BARTON, THE KALINGAS, supra note 113, at 131. For a similar practice in the Solo-
mons, see R. CODRINGTON, supra note 90, at 326-27.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 6-30.
1989]
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
of the state when the example of the Yurok, and of many other na-
tions, proves that there is no inherent connection between legal and
political institutions. The Yurok procedure is simplicity itself. Each
side to an issue presses and resists vigorously, exacts all it can, yields
when it has to, continues the controversy when continuance promises
to be profitable or settlement is clearly suicidal, and usually ends in
compromising more or less. Power, resolution, and wealth give great
advantages; justice is not always done; but what people can say other-
wise of its practices?218
Reflection on the Yoruk method of dispute resolution reveals that it is also
an apt description of international law.219 As in international controversies
when each side "presses and resists vigorously," bloodshed sometimes en-
sues. The feud begins and is ultimately settled.220 From the purely eco-
nomic point of view the result may be "woe to the victors, ' 221 as settlement
may necessitate compensation for the deaths or wounds of the vanquished.
The Ifugao, another stateless group, have more complex dispute resolu-
tion machinery. As noted earlier,222 retaliation or self-help may be an ac-
ceptable means of enforcing one's rights. Instead, the claimant may hire a
monkalun to mediate the claim. This mediator must not be closely related
to either party or he will have no credibility. His role is well-established and
strongly defined:
To the end of peaceful settlement he exhausts every art'of Ifugao diplo-
macy. He wheedles, coaxes, flatters, threatens, drives, scolds, insinu-
ates. He beats down the demands of the plaintiffs or prosecution, and
bolsters up the proposals of the defendants until a point be reached at
which the two parties may compromise. If the culprit or accused be
not disposed to listen to reason and runs away or "shows fight" when
approached, the monkalun waits till the former ascends into his house,
follows him, and, war-knife in hand, sits in front of him and compels
him to listen.223
The ethnographer describing the role of the Monkalun in the Ifugao
system notes that behind his persuasive powers, as in the compulsory
processes of State organizations, "[the] lance is back of every demand of
importance .... ."224 For the aggrieved creditor, satisfaction of his claim is
essential to the maintenance of his pride, reputation and, indeed, his self-
preservation. Forbearance towards his debtors would be regarded as cow-
ardly and would subject him to the rapacity of his fellows. These dangers
also beset the debtor who must not allow himself to be perceived as an easy
target for a claim. On the other hand, his life is at risk. "It is the part of the
218. 1 A. KROEBER, supra note 13, at 22.
219. See the collection of materials in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 10-35 (1980); see also McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman,
Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188
(1968), reprinted in M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLE-
MENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 43 (1981).
220. 1 A. KROEBER, supra note 13, at 49-52.
221. Id. at 49.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 203-07.
223. R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 87 (emphasis in original). For a comparison
with international mediation, see E. HOEBEL, supra note 31, at 121-22.
224. R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 87.
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accused to dally with danger for a time, however, and at last to accede to the
best terms he can get, if they be within reason. '225
If the facts are disputed, the monkalun may administer an ordeal; boil-
ing water or a hot knife is used to determine guilt.2 26 Duels are used to settle
some disputes and wrestling matches settle boundary disputes.227
A distinctly different method of dispute resolution exists among the
Kapauku. Here, recognized "big men" take charge of controversies. The
role is neither inherited nor elected. "Big men" seem to be chosen by con-
sensus and have no formal authority but nonetheless exert leadership and
power. Hogbin thoroughly and succinctly describes the characteristics of
the "big man" on the island of Wogeo that seem apt for a description of the
"big man" throughout much of Melanesia:
Headmanship goes with generosity. To win approbation the
leader must be open-handed to all. He keeps a free house and distrib-
utes food, betelnut, and tobacco not only to his own villagers but to
visitors from further afield; he inaugurates the bigger feasts and pro-
vides the bulk of the supplies; and he is ready with a contribution when
his followers arrange small gatherings for a family celebration. Of ne-
cessity therefore his gardens and coconut and areca-palm groves are
extensive, a good deal larger than those of other people, and he owns
many pigs. This means that he has to spend much of his time tilling
the soil and erecting fences to prevent destruction of the crops by do-
mestic or wild animals. His followers are willing to help if called
upon-on occasion too when he has made no specific request-but he
is there toiling almost every day. A traditional saying runs that a
stranger can easily discover who is the headman by looking for the
person with dirty hands and muddied feet or, alternatively, the one
who smells of sweat.
It is said that at a feast he should leave the most succulent taro,
the slabs of lean pork, and the strips of white fat and be content with
bones . . . . 'The host should see that ordinary folk depart with full
bellies; he himself holds back and tightens his belt.'22 8
While self-help and retaliation are available as methods of resolving dis-
putes,2 29 many disputes are resolved by the "big man." When he comes
upon the scene of a dispute, usually summoned by the sound of loud angry
voices, he listens patiently to the disputants' charges and counter-charges,
questions the parties and the witnesses and often elicits a confession from the
225. Id. at 88. For similar mediators elsewhere, see R. BARTON, THE KALINGAS, supra note
113, at 164-67; Gulliver, On Mediators, in SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE LAW 15 (1. Hammett
ed. 1977).
226. R. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW, supra note 5, at 89-90.
227. Id. at 90-92. For duels in Australia, see C. HART & A. PILLING, THE Tiwi OF NORTH
AUSTRALIA 80-82 (1960).
228. I. HOOBIN, THE LEADERS, supra note 72, at 40. On Wogeo, the title "headman" or "big
man" is hereditary in the sense that the titleholder's father must have had this title. The title does
not necessarily pass to the eldest son. On New Guinea, the title is generally acquired rather than
inherited. Id. at 42. Compare the description of the "big man" in L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY,
supra note 17, at 67-68. See also Errington, Order and Power in Karavar, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY
OF POWER 23, 37 (R. Fogelson & R, Adams eds. 1977).
229. See supra text accompanying note 203.
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culprit or otherwise comes to a factual conclusion. He then makes a deter-
mination of what should be done.230
VI. WHY ARE CONTRACTS ENFORCED?
There is no easy answer to this question, perhaps because the answer
may be too deep in the human psyche to discover. Why is a person outraged
if he or she is slapped in the face, spat upon or mugged? The appealing
answer is that the feeling of outrage is "human nature," a genetic trait, much
like hunger or fatigue. The difficulty with this conclusion is that not all
peoples agree as to what constitutes offensive behavior or what constitutes a
contract. The acquisitive Kapauku do not regard an exchange of promises
as binding, implying that for them, a breach of an executory contract is not
outrageous. 231 Yet many societies deem such promises to be morally and
legally binding and a breach of promise to be outrageous. 232 When a person
is outraged, there is a serious possibility that he or she will resort to violence
if there is no other avenue of redress.
Every society about which this author has found information is out-
raged by the non-payment of debt. In a debt collection case the restitution
and expectation interests normally coincide233 and a violation of this combi-
nation seems to provoke the most outrage. In 1805, the United States Gov-
ernment dispatched Zebulon Pike to explore the headwaters of the
Mississippi and to make contact with the indigenous population. He found
the chiefs in possession of British flags and medals which they regarded as
insignia of office.234 He induced them to part with these in exchange for his
230. L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 17, at 236-38.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 180-81.
232. A compilation of old Irish law believed to date to 438 A.D. contains this somewhat surpris-
ing sentence: "There are three periods at which the world dies: the period of a plague, of a general
war, of the dissolution of verbal contracts." INTRODUCTION TO SENCHUS MOR 51 (Engl. trans.
1865 & 1983 photo. reprint). An anonymous commentator indicates that these calamities cause the
departure of people, cattle and worthiness, respectively. Id.
Harry Truman was asked by an interviewer, "Mr. President, Judge Ridge says that in this part
of the country a man's word was very important when you were a boy. A man had to stand by his
word, and that's the way you were brought up." Mr. Truman's reply was:
That's true. Unless you were a man who stood by what he said, you were not well
thought of around here and you never got very far, never got anywhere at all in this part of
the country.
And you never had to sign a piece of paper when you made a bargain. If you made a
trade with a man, if you said you'd take so much for so many head of cattle, why, that was
what you agreed on, and if the fella you'd made the bargain with came along later, it never
did matter how much time had passed or if the price might have changed in the meantime,
you just live up to what you had agreed on at that earlier time. That's what your word
meant.
In those days, in the time I was growing up and when I was a young man, people
thought more of an honest man than any one thing, and if a man wasn't honest, he
wouldn't stay long in the neighborhood. They would run him out.
And I have never changed my mind since. You have to stick by your word. Trust is
... why, it has always seemed to me that unless you can trust a man and he can trust you,
why, everything breaks down.
M. MILLER, PLAIN SPEAKING: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 47-48 (1974).
233. For an exceptional case, Kapaukuan real property must be sold for its customary price. If
sold for less, the seller or his heirs may, after conveyance, recover the difference between the custom-
ary price and the agreed price. Clearly, in this case the restitution interest supersedes the expecta-
tion interest. L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS, supra note 17, at 209-10.
234. Z. PIKE, supra note 137, at 70-71, 87, 101.
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promises of American flags and medals. Federal agents failed to honor his
promises. His own assessment of the breach was:2 35
This has left a number of the Sioux and Sauteur chiefs without their
distinguishing marks of dignity, and has induced them to look on my
conduct toward them as a premeditated fraud, and would render my
life in danger, should I ever return amongst them, and the situation of
any other officer who should presume to make a similar demand ex-
tremely delicate; besides it has compromitted the faith of our govern-
ment with those savage warriors, which, to enable any government
ever to do good, should be held inviolate.
Anyone who has read Pike's journal recognizes him as an understated and
brave man. That he should fear for his life shows his recognition of the
depth of outrage felt by the disappointed chiefs.
An examination of two reasons for contract enforcement-the venting
of outrage and preservation of public peace-can profit from an analysis of
the case of Ij Bun of Botu, a Kapaukuan. z 36 Bun lived a prosperous life. He
had three wives, twelve children and did no work other than the buying and
selling of pigs. He borrowed heavily and also bought pigs on credit. Resi-
dents of his village were bothered by the incessant complaints of his unpaid
creditors. In March 1955, in a distant village, Bun made a deal to deliver
three large pigs and was given a down payment in beads and shells. Four
months later the purchasers went to Bun's village to accept delivery of the
pigs. They discovered that he had none and that, moreover, he had no
money to repay them and was in a distant village. The purchasers
threatened that they would return to forcibly seize pigs belonging to his
cousins and co-villagers. They in fact reappeared, armed with bows and ar-
rows, together with many other armed men, presumably kin and other credi-
tors. The village "big man" and Bun's kin assured the war party that they
would see to it that they would receive satisfaction in three days.
Meanwhile five "big men" presided over a public meeting that lasted a
week-a week of oratory during which Bun's fate was discussed. Some of
the villagers called for the death penalty. The final outcome was that his kin
took up a collection to make satisfaction. During the week of oratory, Bun,
squatting, looking on the ground, was constantly reprimanded. Part of one
of the reprimands shows the gist of the oratory:
You simply travel and think how to steal something. You have
forgotten how to make gardens, and how to make houses. You simply
exploit all of us by eating from our shelves. You raise no pigs, you
make no garden, you have no cowries, no beads, no houses. The credi-
tors will take our pigs away and burn our houses. You are really a
burden to us all, a bad man in our community. If the creditors take
our pigs or burn our houses, we are going to kill you with pogo
arrows.
237
One can note several things about this case. There had been many com-
plaints from Bun's creditors. None had previously taken action which indi-
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cates that not all claimants promptly seek a remedy. Nonetheless, his
conduct endangered the welfare of his village and of his kin wherever resid-
ing. This was a source of serious public concern. Although there is no
Kapauku government, the public makes its voice heard. Bun's co-villagers
were outraged and they understood the outrage of his creditors. That law
was implicated seems clear. Bun does not contest that he is indebted and
neither his co-villagers nor kin contest their liability. Is a week of repri-
manding a sufficient penalty for a deadbeat and con-man who endangers the
lives and property of others? Pospisil indicates that it is indeed a severe
penalty. 238 It was followed by social ostracism. Bun's own conclusion was
"[i]f they would beat me and take away all my belongings it would be better
than this."'239
One can infer certain notions of causation, consequential damages and
the reliance interest from a minor part of Bun's case. Jik, an old man, in-
jured his leg while escaping from the village with his pigs when the war
party appeared. He was permitted during Bun's "trial" to hit Bun with a
stick in retaliation for his injury. In the concluding reprimand, the village
"big man" stated: "[i]f Jik had sons, they would have beaten you or shot
you to death because Jik injured himself so badly while escaping with his
pigs for fear of your creditors. ' ' 240 To speak of a reliance interest may seem
far-fetched because there was no contract between Bun and Jik, much less a
breach. However, the injury was caused by a chain of events stemming from
a breach of contract to deliver pigs to third parties. Jik, as a co-villager, was
an involuntary co-obligor and he both expected and relied on Bun's keeping
his creditors from his door. In a case such as this, Jik's reliance and expecta-
tion interests coalesce.241
Fundamentally, the solution in stateless societies of contractual disputes
reflects the essential continuity of human nature. The complainant appeals
to his debtor: the debtor usually heeds or compromises the claim. If not,
the creditor may resort to violence. Consider, by way of analogy, the en-
forcement today of claims among drug dealers who operate beyond the pale
of the State and whose law is supplied by an underculture administered by
big men. Mediators may instead be employed. Until very recently, duels
and ordeals were employed, as an alternative, throughout the world. An
ultimate solution is the authoritative decision of a community leader that the
debtor render performance, pay damages, make restitution, be punished or
be absolved. Not all of the these solutions are in place in all societies. Cer-
tain patterns recur in diverse societies. Maitland was only partly right when
he stated "[t]he law of one rude folk will always be somewhat like the law of
another." 242 Rather, there seem to be various predispositions toward solu-
tions of human problems, "blue prints, codes or instructions" that allow cer-
tain behavioral norms to be invented.243
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All groups possess law. In this sense, law can be analogized to lan-
guage. All peoples speak, but languages are diverse. A two-year-old child
who has heard only a fraction of the language can compose new sentences,
even poetry, that no one has composed before. Law is omnipresent, but laws
are diverse. Trade is equally natural to humanity. The similarity of behav-
ior in trading relations and in the law pertaining to trade, debt collection,
and dispute resolution that recur in diverse cultures reveals something about
the nature of humankind and both the flexibility of and limitations on its
inventiveness. It is startling to see the strategy of trading with blood broth-
ers arising in various parts of the world. Alternative strategies such as the
silent trade and the professional trader also have a scattered but worldwide
distribution. Remedies for debt such as attack on the debtor, seizure of
property, housesitting and debt slavery also recur in diverse societies. Not
all societies adopt or invent the same trading strategies or substantive law
and procedure, but the range of choices appears small.

